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ARTICLES
COMPETITION POLICY AND THE GREAT
DEPRESSION: LESSONS LEARNED AND
A NEW WAY FORWARD
Alan J. Meese*
The recent Great Recession has shaken the nation’s faith in free
markets and inspired various forms of actual or proposed regulatory intervention displacing free competition. Proponents of such intervention
often claim that such interference with free-market outcomes will help
foster economic recovery and thus macroeconomic stability by, for instance, enhancing the “purchasing power” of workers or reducing consumer prices. Such arguments for increased economic centralization
echo those made during the Great Depression, when proponents of regulatory intervention claimed that such interference with economic liberty
and free competition, including suspension of the antitrust laws, was necessary to foster economic recovery. Indeed, this view has even left its
mark on constitutional law, with several modern Supreme Court justices
claiming that protection for economic liberty and free competition deepened and prolonged the Depression, thereby justifying judicial repudiation of liberty of contract and requiring an expansive reading of
Congress’s Commerce power.
Using the Great Depression as a case study, the Article examines
the link between free competition—and generally applicable regulation
that ensures such competition—and macroeconomic stability. The results of this study shed important light on claims that protection for economic liberty and free competition exacerbated the Depression as well as
modern arguments that coercive interference with free-market outcomes
can speed the ongoing recovery from the recent Great Recession.
Many equate “competition policy” with antitrust law. However,
this Article widens the focus beyond antitrust. This wider focus reveals
that, at least before the Depression, there were two other important
sources of competition policy. Thus, while antitrust regulation, particularly the Sherman Act, protected free competition from undue private
restraint, the Dormant Commerce Clause and Due Process Clauses pro* Ball Professor of Law and Cabell Research Professor of Law, William and Mary Law
School. The William and Mary Law School supported this project with a generous summer
research grant.
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hibited undue state and federal restraints on economic liberty and thus
free competition. As of 1929, then, these three sources of law combined
to create and enforce a unified and doctrinally symbiotic commitment to
free competition as the norm governing American economic life.
Unfortunately, relaxation of antitrust’s anti-collusion standards in
the late 1920s and early 1930s paved the way for the 1933 National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), FDR’s stimulus plan. In particular, the
NIRA fostered collective wage and price setting and banned forms of
normal competition, thereby protecting incumbent firms from more efficient rivals. Antitrust’s surprising embrace of collusive practices also
presaged judicial repudiation of due process protection for economic liberty in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), repudiation which the
Supreme Court confirmed in the late 1930s.
While the Court unanimously overturned the NIRA in Schechter
Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) Congress and many states,
apparently emboldened by Nebbia, responded by enacting various statutes interfering with free competition, some of which survive to this day.
In particular, the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) mandated
collective bargaining with labor cartels known as unions, thereby displacing free competition in wage setting, while the 1938 Fair Labor
Standards Act further displaced such competition by imposing minimum
wages. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court invoked Nebbia-like reasoning when holding that neither the antitrust laws nor the dormant
Commerce Clause prevents states from organizing and enforcing cartels
that would otherwise unreasonably restrain interstate commerce and
thus violate the Sherman Act. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
This “state action” exemption applied, the Court said, even though California producers exported nearly all their raisins to other states. As a
result, the rest of the nation bore the brunt of such collusive output
reduction.
By the mid-1940s the pre-Depression commitment to free-market
competition was a thing of the past. While the antitrust laws still banned
private restraints interfering with free competition, states and the federal
government were entirely free to displace free-market outcomes by statute, or for that matter, exempt private conduct from antitrust regulation.
While proponents advocated the NIRA and other coercive interference
with free markets as recovery measures, both theory and empirical evidence establish that these policies, including cartelization of labor via
collective bargaining mandated by the NLRA, in fact deepened and
lengthened the Depression. If history is any guide, then, free competition
did not cause the recent Great Recession and displacing free competition
will only slow recovery.
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This paper ends by sketching various lessons from the New Deal
experience and advocating a return to the pre-Depression commitment to
free-market competition. While important, antitrust regulation of private
markets cannot ensure the primacy of such competition if states and the
national government are left free to exempt large sectors from such regulation and impose price and output restrictions that would be felonies if
imposed by private parties. Restoration of free competition as the national norm requires a new symbiosis, whereby state and federal efforts
to displace market outcomes are tested by the same skepticism as similar
efforts by private parties. Antitrust experts can assist in developing this
new symbiosis by devoting more intellectual energy to expanding the domain of antitrust by, for instance, advocating the elimination of various
exemptions, particularly Parker’s state action exemption that currently
shelters state-created cartels from the Sherman Act.
This is not to say that competition should be completely unrestrained by private contract or regulation. Even before the New Deal,
courts properly upheld numerous examples of police power regulation
that interfered with contractual liberty while counteracting market failure by combating externalities and monopoly pricing. Contractual restrictions on freedom of action, even those that appear “exclusionary,”
can have similar beneficial effects, furthering free competition and enhancing economic welfare. Like other proposals to interfere with free
competition, recent calls for antitrust to ban certain wealth creating restraints simply because they reduce short run rivalry and raise prices in
a particular market are therefore misguided.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. THE GREAT RECESSION AND REDUCED FAITH IN
MARKETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION POLICIES
BEFORE THE DEPRESSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Commerce Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Antitrust Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. The Due Process Clauses as (Residual) Competition
Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Price Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Entry Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Regulation of Wages and Working Conditions . . .
III. THE RETREAT OF ANTITRUST AND THE GREAT
DEPRESSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Trade Associations Ascendant and Antitrust in
Retreat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Depression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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INTRODUCTION
The recent “Great Recession” has predictably induced a debate
about its cause and how to prevent future downturns. Independent of
macroeconomic events, the nation continues to debate the proper role of
government, and the appropriate division of responsibilities between
states and the national government, in constructing the background regulatory framework necessary to maximize society’s welfare. Many contend that the national government should play a more robust regulatory
role, further displacing free-market competition as the chief method of
allocating the nation’s material and human resources.1 The outcome of
this debate will help determine the nation’s economic course over the
next few decades.
Indeed, additional interference with free competition has already
taken place and more is under consideration. The national government
intervened in the free market with billions in taxpayer dollars to save
both General Motors and Chrysler from the results of normal free-market
discipline and the ordinary functioning of the bankruptcy process.2
Moreover, during the health care debate, Congress narrowly rejected
President Obama’s proposal that the national government enter the health
insurance business via a “public option” in competition with private
1

See infra notes 21–39 and accompanying text.
See generally Todd Zywicki, The Auto Bailout and the Rule of Law, NAT’L AFF.,
Spring 2011, at 66, 68; available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/theauto-bailout-and-the-rule-of-law (discussing auto bailouts in great detail).
2
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providers.3 Congress has also recently reaffirmed the nation’s policy of
encouraging cartelization between health insurance companies and refused to remove other barriers to competition in health care markets,
thereby facilitating economic concentration and higher prices.4
At the same time, many advocate in favor of strengthening the ability of unions—labor cartels—to bargain collectively over employee
compensation.5 Such concerted negotiation over wages, which is exempt
from antitrust regulation, would be felonious if undertaken by suppliers
of non-labor inputs or, for that matter, by salaried employees not permitted to engage in collective bargaining.6 Many also propose to further
displace the role of competition in setting wages, by raising the national
minimum wage, while several states are raising their own minimum
wages.7 Finally, some officials, invoking the partial suspension of the
antitrust laws during the Great Depression as a cautionary tale, contend
that more aggressive antitrust enforcement will increase private market
competition and accelerate economic recovery, even if such enforcement
displaces normal, free-market competition by banning once-lawful conduct that creates wealth.8
Current economic circumstances and resulting public debate are
reminiscent of the Great Depression, during which deplorable
macroeconomic conditions set the stage for a fundamental realignment of
the respective role that private markets, states, and the national government play in allocating and distributing resources.9 This Article therefore employs the Depression, as well as the New Deal and its aftermath,
as a case study to shed light on the role that free-market competition—
and generally applicable regulation in the form of antitrust law that fosters such competition—can and should play in furthering our nation’s
economic progress and promoting macroeconomic stability. In addition,
this paper widens its focus beyond antitrust law and considers other policies that can support or thwart free competition. This broader focus
reveals that there were two other important sources of competition policy
3 See Robert Pear & Jackie Calmes, Senators Reject Pair of Public Option Proposals,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/health/policy/
30health.html?_r=0.
4 See infra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (declaring all violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act felonies).
7 See Blake Ellis, Minimum Wage Increases for Workers in Eight States, CNN MONEY
(Dec. 23, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/12/23/news/economy/minimum_wage_increases
(outlining minimum wage increases over the federal minimum in Arizona, Colorado, Florida,
Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington).
8 See Christine Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era 4 (May 12, 2009).
9 See discussion infra Parts III.B–VII.
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before the Depression, both of which the New Deal Supreme Court
would repudiate, to the detriment of economic welfare.10 That is, both
the “dormant” Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, taken together, placed significant
limits on the ability of states and the national government coercively to
displace free-market competition with monopoly or horizontal cartels.11
When coupled with the Sherman Act, which banned private cartels and
inefficient private monopolies,12 these provisions manifested and enforced a robust, coherent regulatory policy which privileged decentralized private markets and the results they produced over centralized
public or private control. The result was “free competition,” that is, the
allocation of resources by private markets characterized by free entry and
unfettered by unreasonable public or private restraints.
This unity within these three bodies of law and resulting support for
free competition was not accidental, as the three sources of competition
policy were symbiotic, with concepts from one set of doctrines informing
other doctrines and vice versa. For instance, the Sherman Act banned as
unreasonable “direct restraints,” beyond the protection of liberty of contract, private agreements producing the same impact as state regulations
that “directly” restrained interstate commerce and thus ran afoul of the
dormant Commerce Clause.13 Moreover, while the Sherman Act banned
private price fixing, the Due Process Clauses banned price fixing by
states and the national government.14 If properly implemented, such a
framework could facilitate an allocation of resources that maximized the
nation’s potential output and economic welfare.
Unfortunately for the nation’s economic welfare, this unity was not
to last. Even before the Depression, enforcement agencies and courts
began to relax antitrust’s anti-collusion norms, and this relaxation continued after 1929. This relaxation presaged the 1933 National Industrial
Recovery Act and similar recovery measures at the state and federal level
designed to combat the Depression by coercively raising wages and
prices. While the Supreme Court invalidated the NIRA in Schechter
Poultry v. United States, the Court also rejected a liberty of contract challenge to state price-fixing in a purely private business in Nebbia v. New
York, thereby signaling the end of meaningful due process protection for
economic liberty. Congress and the states accepted Nebbia’s invitation
to displace free-market wage and price setting with minimum wages, collective bargaining and outright price controls. The Supreme Court facili10
11
12
13
14

See
See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra
infra
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notes
notes
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277–307 and 354–55, 400–457 and accompanying text.
41–64, 104–37 and accompanying text.
65–103 and accompanying text.
65–80 and accompanying text.
104–22 and accompanying text.
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tated these efforts by removing commerce clause restrictions on both
Congressional and state authority to regulate economic activity, thereby
empowering both sovereigns to impose overlapping restraints that would
not have survived the pre-New Deal legal regime. By the mid-1940s, the
pre-Depression commitment to free competition was a thing of the past.
Proponents of the NIRA, minimum wages, forced collective bargaining and similar measures claimed that these policies would stimulate
economic recovery and foster macroeconomic stabilization. Moreover,
some modern jurists and academics contend that pre-New Deal limits on
congressional power and protection for liberty of contract somehow prevented effective macroeconomic recovery measures. However, both theory and empirical evidence rebut these claims and establish that
interference with free-market wage and price setting actually deepened
and lengthened the Great Depression, by thwarting the normal process of
economic adjustment. Modern policymakers would do well to heed
these lessons and resist additional interference with free competition purportedly designed in response to the latest downturn.
Part I of this Article recounts the recent Great Recession, from
which the nation is still recovering, as well as resulting efforts further to
displace free-market determinations of wages, prices, and output. Part II
begins the case study of the Great Depression and various regulatory
responses by examining three sources of competition policy that were in
effect before 1929: (1) the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) the Commerce Clause, with its affirmative and
dormant components; and (3) the antitrust laws. Taken together, all three
bodies of law protected free-market competition and the wealth-maximizing economic results it produced from undue private, state, and national interference.
Part III details the relaxation of antitrust’s hostility to private sector
collusion during the late 1920s, including the Department of Justice’s
hands-off approach to horizontal cooperation and the Federal Trade
Commission’s (FTC) approval of various “codes of fair competition”
that stifled rivalry. This Part also describes the onset of the Depression
and recounts then-contemporary thinking about possible causes of the
downturn and cures for it. Finally, Part III also discusses the Appalachian Coals decision, in which the Supreme Court declined to condemn a
joint selling arrangement between dozens of coal producers that seemed
to contravene then-current antitrust doctrine, validating a massive private
restraint on free-market competition.
Part IV examines the NIRA, which extended the logic of the FTC
codes and Appalachian Coals, encouraging industries collectively to
raise wages and prices and immunizing numerous collusive practices that
reduced economic welfare from antitrust attack. Part V examines the
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Court’s 1934 decision in Nebbia v. New York, which in sustaining New
York’s imposition of cartel pricing on milk retailers, signaled retreat
from pre-Depression due process precedents protecting free-market pricing and output from undue state and national interference. Part VI recounts the demise of the NIRA, which the Supreme Court unanimously
declared unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry v. United States in 1935.
Part VII examines the limited and short-lived influence of Schechter. To
be sure, the decision restored antitrust regulation over the private sector,
and the Supreme Court soon reversed the “hands off” approach to horizontal restraints exemplified by Appalachian Coals, restoring free competition as antitrust’s organizing principle. However, the Court soon
abandoned Schechter’s Commerce Clause holding, leaving Congress perfectly free to impose market restrictions on an industry-by-industry basis,
thereby avoiding Schechter’s non-delegation limitations. Congress took
full advantage of these developments, as well as Nebbia’s rejection of
economic liberty, imposing direct price and output regulation of various
industries while simultaneously requiring firms with modest connections
to interstate commerce to recognize and support labor cartels known as
unions. This Part also recounts how the New Deal Court in Parker v.
Brown unanimously removed dormant Commerce Clause limitations on
NIRA-like coercive restrictions on price and output adopted by individual states. No longer bound by due process constraints, states now had
carte blanche to directly burden and distort interstate commerce. In so
doing, the Court credited reasoning, first embraced in Nebbia, to the effect that state-mandated cartelization could serve legitimate interests,
thus blunting arguments by the United States that the restriction was indistinguishable from private cartelization.
Part VIII evaluates the New Deal assumption, embraced by some
scholars and modern Supreme Court Justices, that state-enforced cartelization of industry and labor helped reverse the Depression. Basic economic theory suggests the opposite, i.e., that departure from free
competition tended to thwart economic recovery by preventing labor and
product markets from reaching equilibrium, thereby interfering with the
full employment of resources. Recent empirical work confirms this theoretical prediction and establishes that the NIRA and related measures
both deepened and lengthened the Depression. Part IX lays out several
lessons the nation should have learned from the interplay between competition policy and the Great Depression, and offers proposals for expanding the role of free competition in the American economy.
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MARKETS

Dubbed the “Great Recession,” the most recent economic downturn
began in mid-2008.15 That year, real gross domestic product (GDP) fell
at an annual rate of 2% in the third quarter before falling at an annual
rate of over 8% in the fourth quarter.16 The downturn continued into the
first half of 2009, with GDP falling at annual rates of 5.4% and less than
1% in the first and second quarters, respectively.17 A weak recovery
began in the third quarter of 2009, with GDP rising, though sometimes
quite modestly, in each of the next fourteen quarters.18 The slow recovery stalled, at least momentarily, with GDP rising only 0.1% in the fourth
quarter of 2012.19
The national government responded to the Great Recession with
conventional tools of macroeconomic stabilization: a “stimulus package”
of deficit spending and expansionary monetary policy.20 The deep recession and slow recovery also caused many to question the role that free
markets should play in allocating the nation’s resources.21 This widespread skepticism helped give rise to various attempts—some of which
were successful—to reduce the role of free competition in our nation’s
economy. Indeed, shortly after taking office, President Obama finished
the bailout started by President Bush of two of the nation’s largest automobile companies by purchasing General Motors and subsidizing the
sale of Chrysler to Fiat, Italy’s largest automaker.22 By saving firms
whose products many consumers had rejected, the United States thwarted
the discipline that free markets generally impose on poorly-managed
firms and thus distorted market outcomes.23 Moreover, during the debate
15 See Gross Domestic Product: Percent Change From Preceding Period, BUREAU OF
ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdpchg.xls (last updated Feb. 28, 2014).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 See id. For instance, GDP actually fell at an annual rate of 1.3% in the first quarter of
2011 and rose at an annual rate of 1.4% in the third quarter of that year. Id. Moreover, GDP
rose at annual rates of 1.2% and 0.1%, respectively, in the second and fourth quarters of 2012.
Id. Finally, GDP rose at an annual rate of 1.1% in the first quarter of 2013. Id.
19 Id.
20 See Alan J. Meese, Section 2 and the Great Recession: Why Less (Enforcement) Might
Mean More (GDP), 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1668–71 (2012) [hereinafter Meese, Section 2 and
the Great Recession] (detailing fiscal and monetary responses by the Bush and Obama Administrations to the economic downturn).
21 See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 186 (2009); see also Daniel Crane, Obama’s Antitrust Agenda, 32
REGULATION 16, 16 (2009) (“[T]he economic crisis has dealt a sharp blow to laissez faire
ideology and reinvigorated political support for regulatory solutions.”).
22 Todd Zywicki, The Auto Bailout and the Rule of Law, NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Spring
2011, at 66, 68 (discussing auto bailouts in great detail).
23 See id. at 70–71 (explaining how firms’ failure in the marketplace brought on financial
distress and how, absent bailouts, both firms would have likely emerged from bankruptcy
reorganization as more effective rivals).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-2\CJP202.txt

264

CORNELL JOURNAL

unknown

OF

LAW

AND

Seq: 10

PUBLIC POLICY

28-APR-14

12:55

[Vol. 23:255

over health care reform, President Obama proposed a so-called “Public
Option,” whereby the national government would enter the business of
providing health insurance, competing directly with private insurance
companies.24 Proponents of this approach claimed that a nationalized
insurance company would grow so large that it could use bargaining
power to drive down the price of health care, thereby underpricing private insurers and dominating the market.25
During the same debate, Congress refused to take various steps that
would have injected additional competition into health care markets. For
instance, Congress rejected calls to repeal the antitrust exemption enjoyed by private insurance companies under the 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act.26 Congress also refused to disturb the same Act’s authorization
for states to exclude out-of-state insurance companies from their own
markets, exclusion that would otherwise offend the dormant Commerce
Clause.27 Finally, Congress declined to preempt so-called “certificate of
need laws,” which prevent new hospitals from entering the market without the approval of an administrative agency required to seek the opinions of incumbent hospitals eager to avoid competition.28 This conscious
inaction helped fortify concentrated markets and ensure lower output and
higher prices than free competition would have produced.29
Not all actual or attempted interference with free markets was industry-specific. For instance, shortly after her confirmation, President
Obama’s first head of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
promised a more aggressive pursuit of monopolies. In particular she
advocated an unprecedented test for liability that would ban some
wealth-creating conduct, thereby preventing large firms from realizing
some efficiencies and displacing the results of ordinary free-market com24 Jonathan Weisman & Janet Adamy, Obama to Endorse Public Plan in Speech, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB125240777810092069.
25 See Robert B. Reich, Why We Need A Public Health Care Plan, WALL ST. J. (June 24,
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124580516633344953.html.
26 Competitive Health Insurance Reform Act of 2011, H.R.1150, 112th Cong. § 4 (2011)
(proposed but rejected legislation that would end McCarran-Ferguson antitrust immunity).
27 See Susan Farmer, Competition and Regulation in the Insurance Sector: Reassessing
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 90 OR. L. REV. 915, 936 (2011) (describing origins and operation of the Act).
28 FTC & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION, Ch. 8,
1–5 (2004) (criticizing the anticompetitive impact of so-called “certificate of need” laws).
29 See id.; see also AM. MED. ASS’N, COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF US MARKETS (2011) (finding that 83% of 368 metropolitan health insurance markets are highly concentrated); Health System Management Project, DEP’T. OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS. (Apr. 23, 2012), https://healthmeasures.aspe.hhs.gov/measure/62 (finding
that 80% of the nation’s metropolitan areas have highly concentrated health care markets); J.C.
Robinson, Hospital Market Concentration, Pricing, and Profitability in Orthopedic Surgery
and Interventional Cardiology, 17 AM. J. MANAG. CARE 241, 241 (2011) (finding that increased hospital concentration resulted in higher prices for studied services).
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petition.30 Moreover, some states have recently banned minimum resale
price maintenance (minimum RPM), a practice the Supreme Court has
(properly) held often creates wealth.31 The Obama Administration has
also sought to expand the prerogatives of organized labor, hoping to
strengthen the hands of unions that already exist and encourage the formation of others.32 The result, of course, would be more collusion between employees and thus wages above the level set by free
competition.33 Finally, both the President and some members of Congress have proposed raising the federal minimum wage, thereby coercively fixing wages higher than free-market levels.34 Several states have
followed suit, setting minimum wages above the federal minimum.35
Many such interventions would serve distributional purposes by, for
instance, redistributing income from employers to employees in the case
of minimum wages, or from monopolists to consumers in the case of
30 Christine Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Vigorous
Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era 4 (May 12, 2009); see also Meese, Section 2
and the Great Recession, supra note 20, at 1671–78 (explaining how standard articulated by
Ms. Varney would ban wealth-creating restraints treated as beneficial competition under current Supreme Court precedent).
31 See, e.g., California v. Bioelements, Inc., Cal. Super. Ct., Riverside Cty., No.
10011659 (2011) (consent decree banning minimum RPM under state law); New York et al. v.
Herman Miller, Inc., 2008-2 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 76,454 (S.D.N.Y. March 21, 2008) (same);
cf. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 880 (2007) (rejecting per
se ban on minimum RPM because the practice often increases economic welfare).
32 See generally U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: WHAT CHANGES TO EXPECT (2009) (detailing various
pending initiatives by President Obama’s NLRB to strengthen the position of unions at the
expense of management); see also, e.g., Notification of Employee Rights Under The National
Labor Relations Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 80,138 (Dec. 30, 2011) (amending prior NLRB regulations
to speed the process of conducting union representation elections by minimizing pre-election
challenges). The Administration also supported failed legislation that would have expanded
the prerogatives of organized labor. See Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act,
S. 3194, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposed legislation requiring states to recognize collective bargaining representatives of public safety employees); Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1409,
111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (proposed legislation allowing organization of a union without a secret
ballot if a majority of employees express a written preference for such organization).
33 GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 279 (4th ed. 1987) (“The labor union is for
the labor market the equivalent of the cartel for the product market.”).
34 See President Barack Obama, 2013 State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013) (advocating increased minimum wage); Original Living American Wage Act, H.R. 229, 113th
Cong. (2013) (proposed legislation requiring minimum wage high enough to guarantee an
income equal to 15% above the poverty level for a family of two); Catching Up to 1968 Act of
2012, H.R. 5901, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012) (proposed legislation raising federal minimum wage
to $10.00 per hour).
35 See Ray Long et al., Quinn Wants Minimum Wage Hike, Assault Weapons Ban, CHI.
TRIB. (Feb. 6, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-02-06/news/chi-quinn-to-callfor-minimum-wage-increase-to-10-an-hour-20130206_1_assault-weapons-minimum-wagepat-quinn-today (detailing proposed increase in Illinois minimum wage to $10 per hour from a
minimum already above the federal minimum); Ellis, supra note 7 (outlining minimum wage
increases over the federal minimum in Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Montana, Ohio, Oregon,
Vermont, and Washington).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-2\CJP202.txt

266

CORNELL JOURNAL

unknown

OF

LAW

AND

Seq: 12

PUBLIC POLICY

28-APR-14

12:55

[Vol. 23:255

tougher antitrust enforcement. However, proponents of these measures
have also claimed that such intervention can spur economic recovery.
For example, former President Bush claimed that bailouts of GM and
Chrysler helped prevent the unemployment rate from rising to 21%.36
Moreover, the first head of President Obama’s Antitrust Division argued
that more aggressive antitrust enforcement, including bans on efficient
conduct, would have helped prevent the Great Recession and also aided
the recovery by spurring more rivalry and thus lower prices.37 Finally,
proponents of higher minimum wages and collective bargaining claim
that such interference with free-market wage setting will increase the
“purchasing power” of low-income employees, stimulating consumption
and GDP.38 Indeed, in his 2013 State of the Union Address, President
Obama claimed that an increased minimum wage would raise incomes
for millions of Americans and be good for business because “it would
mean customers with more money in their pockets.”39
II.

STATUTORY

CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION POLICIES
BEFORE THE DEPRESSION

AND

As Ronald Coase has explained, socially useful competition depends upon background rules created by the state and private parties.40
By the late 1920s, there were three such generally applicable federal
sources of competition policy: (1) the Commerce Clause—both affirmative and negative—of the Federal Constitution; (2) antitrust laws, partic36

See David Shepardson, Bush Defends Auto Bailouts, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 7, 2012, at

A13.
37 See Meese, Section 2 and the Great Recession, supra note 20, at 1643–44 (discussing
the Obama Administration’s suggestion that lax antitrust enforcement helped cause the economic crisis).
38 See FISCAL POLICY INST., A WELCOME BOOST FOR NEW YORK: THE CASE FOR RAISING THE MINIMUM WAGE 1 (2012) (contending that higher minimum wage would increase
purchasing power and create 25,000 jobs in the state); Robert Reich, The Limping Middle
Class, N.Y. Times (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/opinion/sunday/jobswill-follow-a-strengthening-of-the-middle-class.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (contending that
higher minimum wages and stronger unions will enhance consumers’ purchasing power and
thus encourage economic growth); Ellis, supra note 7 (reporting claims that higher minimum
wages will stimulate local economies). See also infra note 381 and accompanying text noting
findings in National Labor Relations Act that collective bargaining will enhance purchasing
power of unionized employees.
39 President Barack Obama, 2013 State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013); see John
W. Schoen, Obama’s Latest Stimulus Plan: Raise the Minimum Wage, NBC NEWS (Feb. 13,
2013, 8:33AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/obamas-latest-stimulus-plan-raise-minimum-wage-1C8350755 (reporting Administration’s claim that raising the minimum wage to
$9 per hour “would help boost economic growth in the form of higher consumer spending”).
40 R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713,
717–18 (1992) (explaining that the background structure of legal entitlements can affect the
nature of economic activity and thus the allocation of resources); R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE
MARKET AND THE LAW, 8–9 (1988) (stating that “competitive” markets often require privatelycreated background rules).
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ularly the Sherman Act; and (3) the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. This Part reviews the content of these three
sources as of 1929, showing that these bodies of law were not hermetically sealed from one another, but were instead symbiotic, with factual
premises and resulting developments in one area of the law often influencing seemingly separate doctrines. Taken together, these three sources
of law constructed a unified and internally coherent framework that protected wealth-creating free-market competition from interference by
state, federal, and private restraints. This framework allowed only that
interference with private ordering necessary to combat market failures
such as externalities or cartel pricing.
A. The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to “regulate commerce
among the several states,” thereby authorizing legislation removing statecreated obstructions of interstate commerce, including monopolies and
cartels.41 Gibbons v. Ogden, for instance, approved Congressional preemption of New York’s creation of an interstate steamship monopoly.42
This power is not unlimited, as Gibbons opined that Congress’s authority
does not extend to purely intrastate activities.43 Applying this principle,
the Supreme Court consistently held, before the Depression, that Congress could not regulate manufacturing, mining, or agriculture—including the wages and working conditions of factory employees or miners.44
Gibbons also suggested that state-created monopolies or other obstructions of interstate commerce themselves violated the Clause, even
without congressional action.45 Thus the Court has wielded the “negative” or “dormant” Commerce Clause against the states for more than
150 years.46 The result was an American “Common Market” and com41 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 227–28 (1899) (assuming that the Framers adopted the Commerce Clause primarily to empower Congress to remove
state-created obstructions to interstate commerce).
42 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
43 Id. at 194–195.
44 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 251 (1918) (invalidating Congressional ban
on interstate sale of products manufactured with child labor); E.C. Knight v. United States, 156
U.S. 1, 1 (1895) (denying Congress the ability to prohibit sugar manufacturers from merging
into a monopoly); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 24 (1888) (holding that states possess exclusive authority to ban production of alcohol intended for export).
45 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197–209; see also Norman Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1398, 1416–17, 1495 (2004) (describing historical setting of Gibbons and distinguishing between the decision’s holding and its dicta).
46 See Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U.S. 421, 421 (1921) (voiding requirement
that non-domestic automobile dealers pay licensing tax quintuple that paid by similar in-state
dealers); Walling v. Mich., 116 U.S. 446, 454 (1886) (voiding state tax discriminating against
liquor from other states); Welton v. Mo., 91 U.S. 275 (1876) (overturning state statute requiring license to sell products made in other states).
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petitive allocation of resources, absent valid federal regulation to the
contrary.47
The Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence did not void
every state commercial regulation falling within Congress’s jurisdiction.
Early on, the Court recognized that Congress could not practically regulate each aspect of interstate commerce within its authority, with the result that states could impose regulations that indirectly restrain such
commerce.48 Thus, state law still provided background rules—inspection, quarantine, health laws, and the like—supporting interstate commerce.49 Such quintessential police regulation, which fit comfortably
within the nineteenth century’s classical, laissez-faire economic paradigm, could eliminate inefficient externalities, overcome market failure,
and thereby facilitate commerce.50
The paradigmatic case affirming such regulation was Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, which sustained a Pennsylvania statute requiring
ships sailing into Philadelphia to employ a local pilot or pay half the cost
of such a pilot into a fund for families of deceased or disabled pilots.51
While Congress possessed the authority to preempt such legislation, the
Supreme Court nonetheless upheld the statute because it dealt with a subject that, given its nature, demanded “different systems of regulation,
drawn from local knowledge and experience, and conformed to local
wants.”52
Where, on the other hand, the subject matter of regulation was “inherently national,” requiring a uniform national rule, or where state legislation burdened interstate commerce “directly,” such legislation was ipso
facto void, regardless of whether Congress had acted.53 Thus, the Court
47 See Norman Williams, Foundations of the American Common Market, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 409, 409 (2006). See also infra Part II.C (explaining how the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause restricted Congress’s authority to displace competitive wage and
price determinations).
48 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203–04.
49 Id. (explaining that inspection laws promote interstate commerce and thus do not interfere with Congress’s commerce power).
50 See Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1,
15–23 (1999) [hereinafter Meese, Liberty and Antitrust] (describing nineteenth century’s
“classical paradigm,” which endorsed police power regulation to combat externalities and
other sources of market failure). See also infra note 420 and accompanying text (explaining
how, during this era, courts equated police power regulation with the power to combat market
failure).
51 See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
52 Id. at 315–17, 320 (concluding that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate the qualifications, compensation and duties of pilots).
53 See Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1110–11 (2000) [hereinafter Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence] (discussing how the Court consistently maintained that regulations touching a “national” matter or burdening interstate commerce “directly” were
unconstitutional); see also Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. 148, 152 (1868) (“[T[here is a class of
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invalidated state bans on importing tobacco, alcohol, and margarine,54 as
well as laws burdening interstate commerce under the guise of health and
safety regulation, many of which blatantly protected states’ domestic industries from out-of-state competition.55 The Court justified these results
in free-market terms, reasoning that the founders adopted the Commerce
Clause to ensure “the freest interchange of commodities among the people of the different States.”56
In the same vein, the Court repeatedly voided state regulation of
rates and other facets of interstate transportation, including the speed,
schedules, stops, and numbers of cars on interstate trains.57 The Court
also voided state price regulation of goods transported across state lines,
particularly exports to other states.58 Thus, in 1927, the Court voided
Rhode Island’s regulation of the price of electricity generated within the
state and shipped to Massachusetts.59 In so doing, the Court relied upon
a 1924 decision voiding Kansas’s effort to regulate the price of natural
gas exported to other states.60 It did not matter that the electricity was
delivered at the state line, where title to the current passed to a different
company, which then distributed the product in Massachusetts, or that
less than 3% of the generating company’s output left the state.61 What
legislation . . . which, from its essential character, is National, and which must . . . belong
exclusively to the Federal government.”).
54 See, e.g., Kirmeyer v. Kan., 236 U.S. 568, 569 (1916) (invalidating prohibition on
cross-border liquor transport); Adams Express Co. v. Ky., 214 U.S. 218, 218 (1909); Schollenberger v. Pa., 171 U.S. 1, 1 (1898) (invalidating ban on sale, in original package, of
oleomargarine).
55 See, e.g., Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 78 (1891) (invalidating statute requiring
re-inspection of meat originally inspected over 100 miles from point of sale); Voight v.
Wright, 141 U.S. 62, 62 (1891) (voiding law requiring inspection of flour imported from other
states); Minn. v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) (voiding statute requiring inspection of meat
twenty-four hours before slaughter); Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence, supra note 53, at 1101–08 (collecting additional decisions voiding state laws
deemed contrary to the Commerce Clause).
56 See Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566, 574 (1878) (voiding discriminatory tax on
sale of goods in original packages imported from other states).
57 See Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, supra
note 53, at 1104; see also Balt. & Ohio Sw. R.R. v. Settle, 260 U.S. 166, 166 (1922) (voiding
regulation of interstate rail rates); McNeill v. S. Ry. Co., 202 U.S. 543, 560 (1906) (invalidating requirement that interstate railroads deliver railcars to particular siding); Ill. Cent. Ry. v.
Illinois, 163 U.S. 142, 435 (1896) (invalidating law prescribing location of interstate train
stops); Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 558 (1886).
58 See Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 298 (1924) (voiding regulation
of the price of natural gas exported to other states); Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50,
52 (1922) (invalidating regulation of the price of grain exported to other states).
59 See Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 83 (1927) (voiding
state regulation of the price of electricity exported to other states).
60 Id. at 89 (“[T]his case is controlled by the Kansas Gas Company case.”).
61 Id. at 90 (“Nor does it matter that the business of the Narragansett Company [is]
chiefly local”); id. at 86 (reporting that “one thirty-fifth” of the regulated firm’s electricity
output was exported).
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mattered, instead, was that price fixing directly burdened the interstate
distribution of that small fraction of output that was exported.62 States
could not regulate such prices “in the guise of protection to their respective local interests.”63
Just before the Depression, then, ample authority prevented states
from interfering with free-market pricing and resource allocation with
respect to interstate commerce. At the same time, states were free to
impose indirect restraints that counteracted market failures and facilitated
interstate commercial activity. Moreover, the dormant Commerce
Clause did not prevent states from regulating local commerce, including
manufacturing, mining, agriculture, or the wages and working conditions
of employees engaged in these pursuits, as regulating these activities was
thought to exceed congressional authority.64
B. Antitrust Regulation
Passed in 1890, Section 1 of the Sherman Act banned “contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies” in restraint of interstate commerce.65
Section 2 banned “monopolization,” and attempts to monopolize, any
“part of” such commerce.66 Because the dormant Commerce Clause displaced anticompetitive state restraints or regulation of interstate commerce, the statute only applied, as a practical matter, to private
conduct.67 Moreover, the Act necessarily left intrastate restraints to state
antitrust laws. As a result, jurisdiction over the sort of restraints governed by the Sherman Act and its state counterparts was mutually
exclusive.68
Section 1 restricted concerted action and thus contractual freedom,
while Section 2 restricted unilateral conduct and thus the disposition of
property as well.69 Moreover, the Act could have swept broadly, given
that all contracts restrain trade in some sense. In Joint Traffic Association v. United States, however, Justice Peckham imposed a “reasonable
construction” on the statute, lest it ban various “ordinary contracts and
62

Id. at 90.
Id.
64 See supra note 44 collecting authorities. See also infra Part II.C (describing due process limitations on such local regulation).
65 15 U.S.C. §1 (1890).
66 15 U.S.C. §2 (1890).
67 See Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L. J. 375, 379
(1982) (“The Senator’s paradigm was simple: if a restraint on trade was located entirely within
a state, it was out of Congressional reach. On the other hand, if a combination or conspiracy
was located in more than one state, then the entire combination was beyond the jurisdictional
power of the state . . . .”).
68 Id.; E.C. Knight v. United States, 156 U.S. 1, 12–17 (1895).
69 See Copperweld v. Independence Tube, 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (articulating antitrust’s
distinction between unilateral and concerted action).
63
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combinations” sheltered by liberty of contract.70 Borrowing from Commerce Clause jurisprudence, he construed the statute to ban only “direct”
restraints on interstate commerce, analogous to the sort of state-imposed
direct restraints that contravened the dormant Commerce Clause.71 Restraints were “direct,” if, like the railroad cartel before the Court, they
reduced horizontal rivalry and increased prices above the competitive
level, without offsetting economic benefits.72 Moreover, in Northern Securities v. United States, the controlling fifth vote, Justice Brewer, read
the Act in light of the “inalienable right” to own and invest property,
concluding that the Act did not destroy “minor contracts in partial restraint of trade,” but instead banned only “unreasonable” restraints.73
Just seven years later, the Court, in Standard Oil v. United States, endorsed this “rule of reason,” holding that Section 1 did not ban all contracts that literally “restrained trade,” but instead banned only those
agreements beyond the protection of liberty of contract because they restrained trade or competition “unduly.”74 This result left “normal” contracts that increased trade and were necessary to effective competition

70 Joint Traffic Ass’n v. United States, 171 U.S. 505, 567–68 (1898) (holding that the
Sherman Act does not outlaw “ordinary contracts and combinations” protected by liberty of
contract). The Court noted: “The act of Congress must have a reasonable construction, or else
there would scarcely be an agreement or contract among business men that could not be said to
have, indirectly or remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and possibly to restrain
it.” Id. at 568.
71 Id. at 567–68; Meese, Liberty and Antitrust, supra note 50, at 53–57 (explaining that
formative era antitrust jurisprudence drew upon liberty of contract principles in defining distinction between direct and indirect restraints); see also Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299
(1851) (emphasizing that dormant Commerce Clause does not preempt indirect regulations of
interstate commerce); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, 143–44 (1998) [hereinafter CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE
NEW DEAL COURT] (contending that late nineteenth century Commerce Clause jurisprudence
reflected influence of conceptual categories developed in the liberty of contract context). Professor Cushman’s formidable work highlighting the relationship between liberty of contract
and Commerce Clause jurisprudence helped inspire this project’s examination of the interrelation between the doctrinal categories relevant to competition policy during the period studied.
72 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 235–45 (1899) (holding that cartel between pipe manufacturers set unreasonable prices and therefore directly restrained trade); Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 569–74 (holding that cartel between competing
railroads directly restrained trade where firms received public franchises and the power of
eminent domain); see also Meese, Liberty and Antitrust, supra note 50, at 43–67.
73 See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 361 (1904) (Brewer, J.,
concurring) (“Freedom of action [in the investment of property] is among the inalienable rights
of every citizen.”); id. (Sherman Act does not ban reasonable partial restraints of trade); see
also id. at 403 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (Congress cannot regulate commercial activity based
upon “a remote result of the exercise of an ordinary incident of property and personal freedom”). In his dissent, Justice Holmes noted that the plurality’s opinion would “make eternal
the bellum omnium contra omnes and disintegrate society so far as it could into individual
atoms.” Id. at 411.
74 See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60–62 (1911).
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unscathed.75 Prior decisions, the Court said, had applied this “standard
of reason,” albeit implicitly, to distinguish between “direct” and “indirect” restraints.76 As a result, the Court said, restraints previously condemned as “direct” would now be condemned as “unreasonable.”77 The
Court applied similar principles to Section 2, stating that interpreting
Section 2 too literally could potentially “render difficult, if not impossible, any movement of trade in the channels of interstate commerce.”78
Restraints on trade or competition were “undue,” the Court said, if they
produced “the consequences of monopoly,” which the Court defined as
an exercise of market power resulting in above-market prices, belowmarket output and sub-optimal quality.79 Such reduced output, of
course, resulted in a misallocation of resources and a market failure,
thereby justifying regulation under the classical paradigm.80
The quintessential “undue restraint” contravening the rule of reason
was a multi-state cartel with sufficient market power to impose unreasonable prices, what courts had previously condemned as “direct restraints.”81 In the three decades preceding the Depression, the Supreme
Court repeatedly declared such departures from normal competition vio75 Id. at 62 (Section 1 “prevent[s] undue restraints of every kind” on the assumption that
the “individual right to contract when not unduly or improperly exercised was the most efficient means for the prevention of monopoly.”); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 106, 180 (1911) (Standard Oil held that “the term restraint of trade . . . should be given a
meaning which would not destroy the individual right to contract . . . .”). Various scholars
contend that Standard Oil’s liberty-protecting construction of the Sherman Act constituted a
departure from the standard announced in earlier decisions such as Joint Traffic and TransMissouri Freight; see, e.g., RUDOLPH PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA 50–58 (1996);
MARTIN SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 117–50 (1988);
Edward Corwin, The Antitrust Acts And The Constitution, 18 VA. L. REV. 355, 368–70 (1932).
As I have shown elsewhere, however, these scholars read too much into Joint Traffic and
Trans-Missouri Freight, the rationales of which were limited to instances in which states
granted privileges to colluding parties, e.g., special grants of land and delegations of the power
of eminent domain. See Meese, Liberty and Antitrust, supra note 50, at 43–56; see also Alan
J. Meese, Standard Oil as Lochner’s Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783 (2012).
76 See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 66–68.
77 Id. (approving results in Joint Traffic and Trans-Missouri Freight, both of which had
condemned railroad cartels as “direct” restraints).
78 American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 180–81 (“[T]he words ‘restraint of trade’ did not embrace all those normal and usual contracts essential to individual freedom, and the right to
make which was necessary in order that the course of trade might be free . . . .”).
79 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 57, 64 (prohibition on restraints of trade was aimed at conduct “producing or tending to produce the consequences of monopoly”). Standard Oil listed
the “evils” of monopoly as: (1) the power to fix prices; (2) the power to limit output and (3)
reduced product quality. Id. at 52.
80 See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 77, 86–87 n.42 [hereinafter Meese, Price Theory, Competition] (explaining that classical
economists understood this impact of monopoly pricing); see also Meese, Liberty and Antitrust, supra note 50, at 15–23 (explaining classical economic paradigm equating the police
power with authority to combat externalities and resulting market failure).
81 See, e.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 235–40 (1899).
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lations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.82 The Court applied a similar
rule to vertical price fixing, which, it claimed, had the same economic
impact as horizontal price fixing.83 This ban on direct or undue restraints
initially included labor activity.84 As a result, the ban could reach
strikes—concerted action by rivals in pursuit of higher wages—that had
the requisite effect on interstate commerce.85 However, the 1914 Clayton Act exempted labor unions from the antitrust laws, leaving unions
free to form cartels limiting labor output and increasing wages.86 Analogous conduct by independent contractors still violates the Sherman Act.87
During the early 1920s the Court went further, banning what scholars call “facilitating practices,”88 namely, sophisticated information sharing programs mediated by trade associations.89 Such practices included
“open competition plans,” designed to facilitate “[c]o-operative competition,” not “[c]ut-throat competition,” the latter of which supposedly was
“blind, vicious, and unreasoning.”90 Often managed by independent consultants,91 such plans required participants to file prices and price
changes with a central agent, who would distribute such information to
82 See United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 394–98 (1927) (banning price
fixing agreement between “members of a combination controlling a substantial part of an industry . . . .”); see also Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 391 (1905) (finding that
government stated valid Sherman Act claim by alleging that dominant firms fixed purchasing
prices below what would have obtained if “bidding really was competitive”); Addyston Pipe,
175 U.S. at 235–38 (condemning as “direct” restraint that raised prices above the competitive
level); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association 166 U.S. 290, 332–43 (1897) (invoking railroads’ status as “public corporations” that received special benefits from the state to
justify ban on collusive agreements).
83 See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911)
(citing, inter alia, United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff’d 175 U.S. 211 (1899)).
84 See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
85 See C.J. Primm, Labor Unions and the Antitrust Laws: A Review of the Decisions, 18
J. POL. ECON. 129, 133 (1910) (concluding after review of 1890s case law that strike for higher
wages violated Section 1).
86 See Clayton Antitrust Act, Pub. L. 63–212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (articulating the scope of this exemption).
87 FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (banning boycott by courtappointed lawyers seeking increased compensation).
88 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 30 (1984).
89 See infra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
90 See Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 393–94 (1921) (reproducing trade association materials asserting that competition “may stimulate trade to abnormal activity”); see also United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 380 (1923)
(replicating promotional materials opining that the Association’s activities “‘will promote better and more safe, sane, and stable conditions’”); ARTHUR JEROME EDDY, THE NEW COMPETITION (William S. Hein & Co. 1986) (1914) (endorsing “New Competition” involving
cooperation between industry participants designed to eliminate destructive competition); BUTLER D. SHAFFER, IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE: THE BUSINESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST COMPETITION,
1918–1938 51–71 (1997) (describing rise of trade associations during the 1920s and their
quest to replace atomistic competition with the “new competition” advocated by Arthur Eddy).
91 See PERITZ, supra note 75, at 76.
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venture participants, usually in advance of when new prices were to take
effect.92 In some cases participants agreed to comply with filed prices,
unless deviations increased prices.93 Such plans even empowered central agents to subpoena information from participants suspected of providing false data or otherwise departing from the agreement.94
Associations would monitor industry conditions, make predictions about
future developments, recommend credit terms, and chastise members for
deviation from Association edicts.95 Failure to comply with such arrangements resulted in fines or expulsion.96
In the early 1920s, the Court condemned such plans, first in American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States97 and then in United States v.
American Linseed Oil Co.98 In American Linseed Oil, Justice McReynolds, a proponent of contractual liberty who had headed President Wilson’s Antitrust Division,99 reiterated Standard Oil’s safe harbor for
normal contracts protected by the Due Process Clause.100 However,
these defendants had entered “a new form of combination . . . resorting to
methods which are not normal,” abandoning their “freedom of action,”
by subjecting their decisions to an “autocratic bureau” whose “necessary
tendency is to suppress competition.”101 Thus, just as the dormant Commerce Clause prevented states from imposing anticompetitive restraints
on interstate commerce, so too did the Sherman Act prevent the imposition of such restraints by private parties. At the same time, the Act left
92 See Am. Column & Lumber Co., 257 U.S. at 394–95 (noting instrument required participants to file a “daily report of all sales actually made, with the name and address of the
purchaser . . . with exact copies of the invoices, all special agreements as to terms, grade, etc.”
(emphasis in the original)); id. at 395 (“Members must file at the beginning of each month
price-lists showing prices f. o. b. shipping point. . . . New prices must be filed with the
Association as soon as made.”); see also Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. at 382–83 (describing
participants’ obligations to supply price lists and daily price reports, discounts and competitive
intelligence); id. at 382 (requiring participants immediately to report “all quotations . . . giving
better terms to the contemplated purchaser than those quoted”).
93 See Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. at 389 (stating that participants agreed to follow
price schedules “unless more onerous [prices] were obtained”).
94 See id. at 381–82.
95 Id. at 386–87.
96 Id. at 382 (requiring participants to forfeit deposit and other “benefits and rights under
this agreement”).
97 257 U.S. 377.
98 262 U.S. 371.
99 See California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 285 n.11 (1990) (noting McReynolds’s service as “President Wilson’s chief antitrust enforcement office”); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (McReynolds, J.) (“Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract . . .”).
100 See Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. at 388 (noting that the Sherman Act did not ban
“normal and useful contracts,” “normal methods” of competition, or “destroy the individual
right to contract” (quoting United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179–80 (1911)));
Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 179.
101 Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. at 389.
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private parties perfectly free to enter “normal” contracts that, while limiting private autonomy, overcame market failure and increased trade.102
Such agreements were analogous to the sort of “indirect” restraints of
interstate commerce that states could impose to advance health and
safety without offending the dormant Commerce Clause.103
C. The Due Process Clauses as (Residual) Competition Policy
Neither the Commerce Clause nor the Sherman Act could prevent
Congress from imposing anti-competitive restrictions on interstate commerce or states from imposing anti-competitive restrictions on intrastate
commerce. As explained below, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments filled these gaps, limiting the ability of
Congress and the states to displace free-market competition when regulating in their respective spheres. In particular, this version of “substantive due process” constrained: (1) price regulation; (2) entry regulation;
and (3) regulation of wages, hours and union status of employees.
1. Price Regulation
By 1929, the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that regulatory
interference with free-market pricing presumptively violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, whichever applied.104 Such “regulation”—which the Court deemed “price fixing”—
deprived firms of profitable yet harmless uses of their property.105 Thus,
such regulations did not combat market failure and therefore exceeded
the police power.106 Regulation of gasoline prices,107 the price of theater
tickets sold in secondary markets,108 and employment agency fees all
failed this test.109
102 See FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 475 (1923) (noting antitrust regulation did not reach normal method of doing business); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 passim (1911) (same); see also Meese, Price Theory, Competition, supra note 80, at
83–89 (explaining how the rule of reason articulated in Standard Oil does not prohibit normal
agreements that increase trade), 134–41 (explaining how various non-standard agreements
overcome market failure, enhance wealth, and thus are properly deemed reasonable).
103 See supra notes 48–49, 74 and accompanying text.
104 See Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 356 (1928) (noting that “freedom of contract
was the general rule and restraint the exception” (citing Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D.C.,
261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923))). See also DAVID BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING Lochner: Defending
Individual Rights Against Progressive Reform 8-38 (2011) (tracing rise of liberty of contract
in the Supreme Court).
105 See Williams v. Standard Oil, 278 U.S. 235, 239 (1929).
106 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 200–01 (1991) (arguing
that the Supreme Court only sustained abridgements of contractual liberty designed to combat
market failure).
107 Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929).
108 Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
109 Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
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An exception “proved the rule,” as government was free to regulate
prices of industries “affected with a public interest.”110 While the contours of this category were vague, certain principles emerged.111 First,
firms that received state privileges conferring competitive advantages fell
into this category.112 For instance, states granted railroads large parcels
of land and the power of eminent domain.113 This latter power allowed
recipients to purchase strategically-located land at fair market value,
avoiding extortionate prices and excessive bargaining costs that would
otherwise result from bilateral monopoly and conferring a competitive
advantage over rivals without this state-granted authority.114
Other factors militating in favor of such a determination included a
firm’s status as a natural monopoly,115 barriers to entry,116 and the existence or opportunity for collusion.117 Each such factor suggested the
prospect of market failure resulting in reduced output and higher prices,
thereby justifying regulation.118 In one notable decision, Chief Justice
Taft explained for a unanimous Court that, absent state-granted privilege
or ancient custom of regulation, a business was only affected with a pub110

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
See Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Kansas Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522,
535–42 (1923) (elaborating principles determining whether industries are affected with a public interest).
112 Id. at 535.
113 See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. 290, 332–33 (1897)
(“[R]ailways . . . are granted valuable franchises and privileges, among which [is] the right to
take the private property of the citizen in invitum, [and many are] donees of large tracts of
public lands.”).
114 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56 (1992) (explaining how
delegating eminent domain power to railroads can overcome bilateral monopoly and resulting
transaction costs); see also United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 568–72 (explaining that grants of land and eminent domain rendered horizontal rate-making by interstate
railroads “direct restraints” subject to congressional regulation); Thomas M. Cooley, State
Regulation of Corporate Profits, 137 N. AM. REV. 205, 209 (1883) (“[L]egislative permission
to build and operate a railroad is commonly a necessary requisite [to successful operation].”);
Thomas Cooley, Limitations to State Control of Private Business, I Princeton Review (n.s.)
233, 249–55 (1879) (conferral of eminent domain authorized price regulation); but cf.
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 71, at 143–44 (explaining link
between determination that industry is “affected with a public interest,” and determination that
firm’s activity “directly restrains commerce”).
115 Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892).
116 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 276 (1932) (distinguishing ice manufacturing from industries affected with a public interest because sellers did not threaten consumers with “exorbitant charges and arbitrary control”); Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 538.
117 New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 276 (explaining that mills were “affected with a public
interest” because “[t]he individual grower of the raw product is generally financially unable to
set up a plant for himself[,] [so that] he faces the practical danger of being placed at the mercy
of the operator in respect of exorbitant charges . . .”); Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 538; Budd,
143 U.S. at 537–38 (affirming price regulation of “virtual monopolies”); Munn, 94 U.S. at 131
(sustaining price regulation in concentrated market with barriers to entry and collusion).
118 See supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining that propensity of direct restraints to reduce output and enhance prices justified regulation under the Sherman Act).
111
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lic interest and thus subject to price or wage regulation if “without regulation,” the public was, because of the “indispensable nature of the
service” subject to “exorbitant charges and arbitrary control.”119
Thus, coercive interference with market-determined prices was unconstitutional unless market conditions were such that regulated entities
could impose anti-competitive prices and thus directly restrain trade,
thereby empowering states to thwart such restraints, just as the dormant
Commerce Clause and Sherman Act prevented direct restraints by states
and private parties.120 Though somewhat expansive in the late nineteenth century, the category of industries “affected with a public interest”
narrowed considerably by the late 1920s.121 In both periods, however,
most firms fell outside this category and were thus immune from such
regulation.122 As a result, free competition, and not public restraints, almost always determined prices and output in the nation’s various industries during this period.
2. Entry Restrictions
The Due Process Clause also restricted state control of entry into
otherwise lawful businesses. Exercising their police powers, states could
regulate activities that produced externalities and harmed third parties,
i.e., operation of laundries fueled by open fires in windy conditions.123
States could not, however, ban harmless businesses.124 Nor could they
confer monopoly as a means of protecting public health and safety, if
other enterprises could abide by the same health and safety regulations
119

Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 538.
See Tyson Bros v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927); Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 536–44;
see also Budd, 143 U.S. at 532–34 (affirming “sound and just” views of the New York Court
of Appeals that “no general power resided in the legislature to regulate private business . . . fix
the price of commodities or services, or interfere with freedom of contract” and that only
“special conditions and circumstances” justify price regulation).
121 See Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391 (1894) (sustaining price regulation of hundreds of grain elevators); Barry Cushman, Continuity and Change in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1009, 1017–18 (2003) [hereinafter Cushman, Continuity and
Change in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence].
122 Cushman, Continuity and Change in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, supra note
121, at 1017–18 (concluding that very few businesses were deemed “affected with a public
interest” during this period).
123 See Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 708 (1885) (upholding local ban on nighttime laundry operations requiring continuous fires in neighborhoods “subject to high winds”
and consisting of “wooden buildings” because “regulations of such a strict character should be
adopted to prevent the possibility of fires”); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at 200–03
(describing Court’s externality-based substantive due process doctrine).
124 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (voiding ban on teaching German in private
schools); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) (voiding ban on employment agencies); People v. Marx, 99 N.Y. 377 (1885) (voiding ban on sale of oleomargarine); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y.
98 (1885) (voiding ban on cigar manufacture in tenement houses and emphasizing that the
absence of an externality, such as tobacco odor, “did not extend to any of the other rooms of
the tenement house”).
120

R
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governing the monopolist.125 As with price regulation, the doctrine contained rarely met exceptions for industries “affected with a public interest.”126 In nearly all industries, then, individuals were free to enter as
they pleased, so long as they adhered to valid police power
regulations.127
3. Regulation of Wages and Working Conditions
State efforts to regulate input prices, notably wages and hours, fared
little better than barriers to entry.128 Unless wages or working conditions
threatened the health or welfare of employees or the public, such regulation exceeded the police power, offending the Due Process Clause.
Thus, the Court would void, inter alia, legislation setting maximum hours
for bakers,129 minimum wages for women,130 and a law allowing administrative determination of wages paid meatpackers.131 The Justices also
voided bans on “yellow dog contracts”—agreements by employees not to
join a union.132 The Court rejected arguments that legislatures could alter bargains to ensure an “equitable” distribution of the fruits of economic activity.133 Employers, the Court said, were no more responsible
for ameliorating the plight of employees than a grocer was responsible
for feeding poor customers.134
There were, of course, exceptions. For instance, the Court endorsed
maximum hours for women performing standing work in laundries, because such regulation protected the health of third parties, viz., the wo125 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 279 (industries not affected with a
public interest are subject to regulations “prescribed for the protection of the public and applied with appropriate impartiality”) (emphasis added); Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent City
Co., 111 U.S. 746, 756, 758 (1884) (Field, J., concurring) (police power does not justify imposing monopoly when other firms can abide by generally-applicable regulations); id. at
761–62 (Bradley, J., concurring) (same).
126 See New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 272–79.
127 Id. at 278.
128 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897).
129 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58–62.
130 See Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
131 See Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Kansas Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522
(1923).
132 See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (voiding state ban on such contracts); Adair
v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (voiding Congressional ban on such contracts in railroad
industry).
133 Coppage, 236 U.S. at 17 (“[I]t is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property without recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.”).
134 See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 558–59 (“[T]he employer, by paying [a wage equal to services rendered] has neither caused nor contributed to her poverty. . . . In principle, there can
be no difference between the case of selling labor and the case of selling goods. If one goes to
the butcher, the baker, or the grocer to buy food, he is morally entitled to obtain the worth of
his money. . . . [H]e is not justified in demanding more simply because he needs more.”).
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men’s future children and, thus, “the well-being of the [human] race.”135
Miners were properly distinguished from bakers, because there were
“reasonable grounds” to believe that long hours interfered with miners’
health.136 As with price and entry restrictions, these exceptions “proved
that rule,” allowing states or Congress to displace free-market results, but
only in cases in which economic conditions would produce market failure absent state correction. Thus, one scholar has concluded that the
Supreme Court “read into substantive due process doctrine a theory of
externalities” and thus only sustained regulation when it found a “substantial divergence between ‘the public interest and private right[,]’” i.e.,
a market failure.137
*****
On the eve of the Depression, then, three sources of law—the Commerce Clause, the Sherman Act, and the Due Process Clause—were in a
mutually-reinforcing equilibrium. Taken together, these bodies of law
evinced a coherent regulatory philosophy regarding the appropriate relationship between the free market and the State. The Commerce Clause
prevented states from “directly restraining” interstate commerce by creating export cartels or monopolies that thwarted free competition, while
leaving them free to impose “indirect” police power regulations that
could facilitate such commerce. The Sherman Act banned unreasonable,
direct restraints on competition imposed by private parties, particularly
price fixing, leaving “normal” wealth-creating agreements protected by
liberty of contract unscathed. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause precluded local regulations, including price regulation—which
courts termed “price fixing”—that fell outside the police power and unduly interfered with private contracts and thus competitive market outcomes. Finally, while the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to
regulate interstate commerce, that power was not plenary, but instead
subject to the same due process limits that constrained the states.
This mutually-reinforcing equilibrium did not result in unbridled
competition akin to that found in the state of nature or theoretical economic models. Instead, all three bodies of law approved public or private restraints on private autonomy that were necessary to prevent
otherwise unbridled markets from producing social harm in the form of
externalities or other forms of market failure such as monopoly or cartelization. The result was thus free competition, that is, the allocation of
resources by private markets characterized by free entry and unfettered
135 See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (“The limitations . . . are not imposed
solely for her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of all. . . . The two sexes differ in . . . the
influence of vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race . . . .”).
136 See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898).
137 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at 201.
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by unreasonable public or private restraints.138 If faithfully applied, this
unified framework and resulting free-market competition could encourage an allocation of society’s labor, capital and technology that maximized society’s wealth.139 This allocation of resources would also
maximize the value of society’s potential output and, thus, facilitate economic growth.140 Finally, as explained later in this Article, flexible
wages and prices could help attenuate recessions and hasten
macroeconomic recovery.141
III.

THE RETREAT

OF

ANTITRUST

AND THE

GREAT DEPRESSION

The unified market-affirming regime described above was not destined to last long and began to unravel even before the Depression, with
antitrust (de)regulation leading the way. This part examines how antitrust regulation began to retreat shortly before the Depression, setting the
stage for future departures from the free market. This part also examines
the Depression and recounts then-contemporary thinking about possible
causes of the downturn and cures for it. This part also recounts how the
Supreme Court sent mixed signals during the early 1930s about its continuing commitment to the pre-Depression framework that had protected
free competition from undue private and public restraints.
A. Trade Associations Ascendant and Antitrust in Retreat
As explained earlier, the Supreme Court condemned so-called
“open price plans” during the early 1920s, thwarting industry efforts to
facilitate horizontal collusion.142 However, business interests soon found
a sympathetic ear in Herbert Hoover, the Secretary of Commerce from
1921 until 1928. An engineer by training, Hoover embraced the “New
Competition” and its principles of “scientific management,” whereby
138 See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (explaining Sherman Act’s assumption that freedom to compete free of undue regulation would maximize output and minimize prices so long as firms did not employ unreasonable restraints);
George W. Wickersham, The Police Power, A Product of the Rule of Reason, 27 HARV. L.
REV. 297 (1914).
139 See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172–203 (1932) (outlining various
sources of externality and regulatory responses to increase national dividend); Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 pt. 2 AM. ECON. REV. 105 (1969)
[hereinafter Williamson, Allocative Efficiency] (sketching contours of wealth-maximizing antitrust regime).
140 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 519, 692 (1998) [hereainafter
MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS] (explaining how improvement in utilization of resources
can enhance economy’s overall productivity and how technological improvement can increase
nation’s potential output).
141 See infra notes 486–508 and accompanying text (discussing theory and evidence establishing that flexible wages and price facilitate economic recovery while inflexible wages
and prices slow recovery).
142 See American Column Lumber v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 393 (1921).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-2\CJP202.txt

2013]

COMPETITION POLICY

unknown

AND THE

Seq: 27

28-APR-14

GREAT DEPRESSION

12:55

281

firms eliminated waste, enhanced productivity, and thus raised living
standards by paying higher wages.143 Hoover opposed regulation that
attempted to curtail “New Competition” and endorsed self-regulation by
trade associations, with the government disseminating information to facilitate private collective action.144 While Hoover opposed legislation
narrowing antitrust laws,145 his repeated lobbying caused the Department
of Justice to author comfort letters sheltering from prosecution businesses that adopted open price plans contravening the Court’s decisions
in American Column Lumber and American Linseed Oil.146
Moreover, even before 1920, the Federal Trade Commission began
convening “trade practice conferences,” that is, industry-by-industry
trade association gatherings.147 Participants agreed on “codes of fair
competition,” which the Commission would then consider and approve,
sometimes with amendments.148 Violations of some such rules were
“unfair methods of competition” contrary to the Federal Trade Commission Act and “rules” in a second category were advisory.149 During the
late 1920s, a business-friendly majority of the Commission encouraged
these conferences, holding fifty in fiscal year 1929, more than in several
143

See ROBERT F. HIMMELBERG, THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRA10, 14–18, 20–21, 26–29 (1993); WILLIAM J. BARBER, FROM NEW ERA TO NEW DEAL:
HERBERT HOOVER, THE ECONOMISTS, AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY, 1921–1933, at 5
(1985).
144 Herbert Hoover, Introduction to LIONEL EDIE, THE STABILIZATION OF BUSINESS v, vii;
id. at viii (“For the government to attempt to regulate such matters is inconceivable, but the
government can collect and disseminate information that would be helpful to business.”); BARBER, supra note 143, at 8–13 (describing Hoover’s support for trade associations and the “indicative planning” approach); SHAFFER, supra note 90, at 52 (“The trade association
movement had many promoters, but there were none more enthusiastic in their support than
Herbert Hoover.”); HIMMELBERG, supra note 143, at 10–11 (detailing Hoover’s views on trade
associations).
145 See HIMMELBERG, supra note 143, at 31–33. Hoover’s resistance to partial repeal of
the antitrust laws was partly strategic. That is, he feared that such repeal would produce cartelization, inflated prices, and public demands for direct regulation or nationalization of industry,
a result Hoover opposed. See id. at 68–69. Hoover thus echoed William Howard Taft, who
believed the nation faced a choice between competition enforced by the antitrust laws and
Socialism. See SKLAR, supra note 75, at 378 (quoting Taft as stating “If [competition] is
impossible then let us go to Socialism for there is no way in between.”).
146 HIMMELBERG, supra note 143, at 43–72; id. at 57–59 (describing these comfort
letters).
147 THOMAS BLAISDELL, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: AN EXPERIMENT IN CONTROL
OF BUSINESS, 93–94 (1932) (reporting that this practice started in 1919).
148 Id. at 92–102 (describing this process); see also ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1928, at 5–16 (describing this procedure
and various industries that participated); id. at 5 (“The work of this division has increased
enormously during the past fiscal year.”); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1930, at 37 (reporting fifty-seven conferences held during
fiscal year).
149 See SHAFFER, supra note 90, at 83–84 (documenting Commission’s policy of enforcing Group 1 rules against violators including those who had dissented from rules when conference was held).
TION

R

R
R

R
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prior years combined.150 Such conferences governed industries as varied
as barn equipment, beauty and barber supply, cheese assemblers, and
fertilizer.151
Many of the resulting codes banned either or both below-cost pricing and price discrimination, regardless of whether such prices produced
anticompetitive results.152 Others adopted miscellaneous provisions limiting rivalry in various ways. For instance, the Commission approved a
code proposed by the Virginia Petroleum Industry prohibiting gasoline
stations from holding lotteries or giving products away on “opening
days, special sale days, or other occasions.”153 Other codes prohibited
the extension of consumer credit, eliminating a form of discounting.154
One contemporary commentator concluded that “the interests of the consumer have received remarkably little consideration.”155
B. The Depression
Hoover became President in March of 1929. The Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) composite stock index peaked at 254 in September and
unemployment hovered around 3%.156 By late October of that year,
however, the S&P index had fallen to 162, national output was falling,
and unemployment was climbing.157 By 1932, output had fallen 28%
from its 1929 peak, the S&P Index stood around fifty; unemployment
had risen to 23.6% and would climb to almost 25% by 1933.158
Hoover responded aggressively to the downturn by taking numerous
concrete steps, some of which, in hindsight, were counterproductive.159
150

See HIMMELBERG, supra note 143, at 62–64; see also ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDTRADE COMMISSION FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1929, at 30 [hereinafter 1929 FTC
ANNUAL REPORT] (recounting expansion of trade conference staff to handle additional work);
BLAISDELL, supra note 147, at 93–94 (“[B]etween 1919 and 1929 there were eighty-three trade
practice conferences . . . . [S]ixty were held between July 1, 1927, and November 15, 1929.”).
151 See 1929 FTC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 150, at 34–38.
152 See HIMMELBERG, supra note 143, at 63 (stating that, as of 1928, such codes “routinely” banned below-cost pricing and price discrimination without any additional requirement
that such activities actually injure consumers); but see BLAISDELL, supra note 147, at 97 (stating that the FTC amended bans on below cost pricing in 1930 to require “intent and effect of
injuring a competitor”). Of course, the mere fact that a price cut injures a competitor does not
thereby establish injury to economic welfare. See A. A. Poultry v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F. 2d
1396, 1403–04 (7th Cir. 1989).
153 See F.T.C, TRADE PRACTICE CONFERENCES 81 (July 1, 1929).
154 See BLAISDELL, supra note 147, at 98–102.
155 Id. at 102.
156 See RUDIGER DORNBUSCH & STANLEY FISCHER, MACROECONOMICS 308–09 (1981);
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
299–308 (1963) (discussing these economic events, including stock market crash).
157 See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 156, at 304–06.
158 Id. at 304; DORNBUSCH & FISCHER, supra note 156, at 309.
159 HERBERT STEIN, THE FISCAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: POLICY IN PURSUIT OF REALITY 16–26 (2nd ed. 1996) (detailing numerous steps Hoover took to counteract the downturn);
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He encouraged states and localities to accelerate public works and cajoled industry to resist wage reductions.160 In his State of the Union
address, Hoover reported:
I have, therefore, instituted systematic, voluntary measures of cooperation with the business institutions and
with state and local authorities to make certain that fundamental businesses of the country shall continue as
usual, that wages and therefore consuming power shall
not be reduced, and that a special effort shall be made to
expand construction work in order to assist in equalizing
other deficits in employment.161
He continued that the “enlarged sense of cooperation and responsibility
which has grown in the business world during the past few years” had
facilitated his efforts.162 He signed a temporary tax cut, but also signed
the Smoot-Hawley Act, raising tariffs on over 890 items.163 Moreover,
in 1932, Hoover signed legislation increasing taxes to bolster the nation’s credit and strengthen the dollar.164 Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve let the nation’s money supply plummet, inaction that, combined
with higher taxes, exacerbated the economic contraction.165
1. Causes and Remedies
Despite Hoover’s efforts, the downturn worsened and Americans argued over the causes of the deepening depression. Some blamed a purported lack of competition, viz., widespread collusion between
businesses and workers during the 1920s. Such collusion, it was said,
raised consumer prices, reducing “real” income. Lower real income, in
turn, reduced “purchasing power,” as consumers were unable to afford
the output of increasingly productive industries.166 While oligopolists
and their shareholders enjoyed hefty profits, wealthy individuals, it was
said, saved a larger proportion of their income than the masses.167 Instead of purchasing new consumer goods, such savings reduced interest
rates and encouraged additional investment in plant and equipment, furid. at 16 (“Hoover’s initial response to the stock market crash . . . was prompt, active, and
strictly according to the book.”). See also infra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
160 STEIN, supra note 159, at 16–17.
161 Id. at 17.
162 Id.
163 BARBER, supra note 143, at 91, 95.
164 STEIN, supra note 159, at 32–33.
165 N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 331–32 (7th ed. 2010) [hereinafter
MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS] (describing fiscal and monetary policy mistakes exacerbating
the 1929 downturn).
166 ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 12–13 (1966).
167 See STEIN, supra note 159, at 48–49.
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ther enhancing productivity and exacerbating excess capacity and the resulting surplus.168 Moreover, once the downturn started, some argued,
rigid prices thwarted the process of natural economic adjustment that
would have restarted the economy.169
Others argued that too much competition helped cause and prolong
the Depression. These advocates claimed that unbridled rivalry between
farmers, small businesses, and workers kept profits, farm prices, and
wages low, thereby reducing consumers’ purchasing power.170 Some
even argued that excessive competition prevented firms from realizing a
fair return on investment and destroyed the incentive to invest, diverting
retained earnings into private savings.171
Each diagnosis suggested a different remedy. If collusion caused or
prolonged the Depression, the remedy was aggressive regulation to ensure atomistic competition. Indeed, University of Chicago economist
Henry Simons suggested just such a program in 1934.172 Simons’s prescription entailed vigorous enforcement of the Sherman Act, including
strict limits on trade associations and labor unions, the latter of which
Simons would not have exempted from antitrust regulation.173 Simons
168

Id.
See HENRY SIMONS, A Positive Program for Laissez Faire: Some Proposals for a
Liberal Economic Policy (1934), reprinted in ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 40, 53
(1948) (“A major factor in the cycle phenomenon is the quite unequal flexibility of different
sets of prices and, more explicitly, the stickiness of prices which, for the bulk of industry,
determine out of pocket operating (marginal) costs . . . . Decisively important in the whole
situation is the exceeding inflexibility of wages—the explanation for which would require
attention to many factors [including] effective labor organization.”). Simons also believed that
incompetent monetary policy was partly to blame. See id. at 54 (“We should characterize as
insane a governmental policy of alternatively expanding rapidly and contracting precipitously
the quantity of paper currency in circulation.”). Simons argued that flexible prices made monetary policy more effective by ensuring accurate signals to economic actors about the scarcity
of resources. See Henry Simons, Economic Stability and Antitrust Policy, 11 U. CHI. L. REV.
338, 343 (1944) (contending that price stabilization in some industries during a depression
“means drawing off a larger share of spending to the particular enterprises, and thus, deepening the depression in other areas of the economy.”). The phrase “natural economic adjustment” refers to the classical macroeconomic paradigm and its assertion that falling prices
would ceteris paribus increase the real money supply thus enhancing aggregate demand. See
infra notes 486–89 and accompanying text; see generally A.C. Pigou, The Classical Stationary
State, 53 ECON. J. 343 (1943) (elaborating this argument).
170 WILLIAM LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL: 1932–1940,
at 36 (1963) (reporting that FDR “accepted the underconsumptionist explanation of the cause
of the depression” and that Roosevelt’s economists “agreed that the crisis centered in a failure
of purchasing power but espoused structural reform rather than deficit spending”).
171 See HAWLEY, supra note 166, at 26–27.
172 See Simons, supra note 169 passim; see also Robert Van Horn, Chicago’s Shifting
Attitude Toward Concentrations of Business Power (1934–62), 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1527,
1528–34 (2011) (describing Simons’s views).
173 SIMONS, supra note 169, at 56–62; id. at 60 (“Given real competition among employers, one might wisely advocate application to labor organizations of the general prohibitions on
restraint of trade.”).
169

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-2\CJP202.txt

2013]

COMPETITION POLICY

unknown

AND THE

Seq: 31

28-APR-14

GREAT DEPRESSION

12:55

285

also proposed federal legislation to charter all corporations engaged in
interstate commerce, limiting the size of such firms to that necessary to
assure pricing flexibility, sacrificing efficiencies if necessary.174
If, on the other hand, the root cause of the Depression was too much
competition, there were other possible remedies. First, some advocated
actual or quasi-nationalization, whereby a federal instrumentality would
own or direct the major means of production, particularly heavy industry
and the commanding heights of the financial system.175 In this way, it
was said, the federal government could modulate excessive swings from
bust to boom and back again.176 Moreover, nationalization could
achieve economies of scale not possible in a competitive system and
would allow consumers and workers to share the benefits of efficiencies
by preventing exploitation of economic power.177
The business community did not object to planning; just to the identity of the planners.178 Even before the Depression, business leaders
were calling for revised antitrust laws that would allow cooperation the
Supreme Court had condemned as unreasonable.179 Gerard Swope, President of General Electric, proposed such state-authorized cartelization to
combat the economic downturn in a 1931 speech addressing the National
Association of Manufacturers.180 Before Congress, Swope argued that
private enterprises could improve working conditions and provide social
insurance to workers by passing on the cost of such programs to consumers.181 Others echoed Swope’s call for state-backed cartelization, im174 Id. at 58 (advocating “[t]ransfer to the federal government of the exclusive power to
charter ordinary, private corporations, and subsequent annulment of all charters granted by the
states”); id. at 60 (size of firms should be “even more narrowly limited [that that necessary to
realize economies of scale], if ever necessary to the maintenance of freedom of enterprise”).
175 HAWLEY, supra note 166, at 13–14.
176 Id.
177 Id. (summarizing views of those who believed that “concentrations of economic
power . . . were necessary for efficient mass production, technical progress and reasonable
security; and while the abuse of this power was largely responsible for the depression [or so
they thought], the idea that it could be dispersed was both impractical and dangerous. The
only real answer lay in systematic organization and planning.”).
178 Henry Simons trenchantly identified the common economic assumptions that motivated the planners on the far left and far right. See Simons, supra note 169, at 338 (“[T]he
layman readily (too readily) concludes that competitive conditions mean instability, and that
the remedy lies in removing competition in favor of some other instrumentality of control . . . .
Such vulgar economic analysis is the main stock-in-trade, not only of our radicals and revolutionaries on the left but of monopolists and cartelizers on the extreme right as well—not to
mention the more ingenious advocates of ‘planned economy.’”).
179 See infra notes 134–40 and accompanying text.
180 BARBER, supra note 143, at 121 (describing Swope’s address).
181 See HIMMELBERG, supra note 143, at 131 (noting Swope’s “frequent presentations
before Congressional Committees”); id. at 135 (describing Swope’s argument that his plan
would empower businesses collectively to stabilize employment and provide employees social
insurance).
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posed coercively on dissenting firms.182 Some members of Congress
even proposed legislation to codify the FTC’s authority to impose codes
of fair competition.183 Early versions of this proposed legislation banned
below-cost pricing and price discrimination as unfair practices, regardless of any impact on competition or economic welfare.184
Although he believed that state-facilitated cooperation was superior
to atomistic competition, Hoover resisted calls for amending the antitrust
laws, instead advocating narrow legislation facilitating collective action
in natural resource industries.185 Indeed, Hoover’s response to Swope’s
plan for horizontal price stabilization was swift and negative:
There is no stabilization of prices without price-fixing,
and this feature at once becomes the organization of gigantic trusts such as have never been dreamed of in the
world. This is the creation of a series of complete monopolies over the American people. It means the repeal
of the entire Sherman and Clayton Acts, and all other
restrictions on combinations and monopoly. In fact, if
such a thing were ever done, it means the decay of
American industry from the day this scheme is born, because one cannot stabilize prices without protecting obsolete plants and inferior managements.186
Moreover, Hoover’s Antitrust Division challenged trade association
activities the Coolidge Administration had approved and encouraged the
FTC to revisit “codes of fair competition” banning below-cost pricing
and price discrimination.187 Finally, despite Hoover’s sympathy for collusive resource conservation, his Antitrust Division challenged the Appalachian Coals joint venture between 137 coal producers in four states that
funneled members’ output through an exclusive sales agency.188 By
1932, despite the severe economic downturn, relaxation of antitrust regulation did not appear in the cards.
182 See SHAFFER, supra note 90, at 93–98 (describing additional support for state-enforced
cartelization).
183 See HIMMELBERG, supra note 143, at 134.
184 Id. (describing bill proposed by Senator Nye banning below-cost pricing regardless of
competitive effect).
185 Id. at 151–52; see also supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text describing Hoover’s view on the relationship between wasteful competition and antitrust law.
186 See BARBER, supra note 143, 121–22 (quoting Hoover’s memorandum).
187 See HIMMELBERG, supra note 143, at 104–05 (describing the Department of Justice’s
litigation against the Sugar Institute and other associations whose activities the Coolidge administration had approved); id. at 90–97 (describing Department’s challenges to activities previously approved by FTC’s trade practice conferences).
188 Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). See also infra notes
191–205 and accompanying text.
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2. Mixed Signals from the Supreme Court
Early in the Depression, then, Hoover had reinvigorated antitrust
enforcement and rejected nationalization and regulation. However, the
Supreme Court’s reaction to new restrictions on free competition was
decidedly mixed, signaling a possible retreat from the unified and internally consistent free-market framework in place before the Depression.
On the one hand, the Court reiterated its opposition to state control of
entry. Thus, in 1932, the Court considered Oklahoma’s requirement that
firms wishing to enter the ice making business obtain a certificate of
public convenience and necessity.189 Both Oklahoma and Justice Brandeis contended that states should be free to experiment with such planning as a means of preventing destructive competition and counteracting
the economic downturn.190 Brandeis noted that easy entry engendered
price wars and that business had made “unremitting efforts . . . to protect
markets and prices from competition.”191 Many agreed, Brandeis said,
“that that there must be some form of economic control” to rebalance
production and consumption.192 Citing the Swope plan and others, he
continued that “[m]en of wide business experience” believed that such
rebalancing required the government to demand that firms obtain state
approval before entering a market.193
Nonetheless, the Court held that limits on entry into ice making exceeded the police power because they encouraged monopoly and did not
protect consumers from impure ice or extortion, or conserve natural resources.194 There was, the Court said, “no difference in principle between this case and the attempt of the dairyman under state authority to
prevent another from keeping cows and selling milk on the ground that
189

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
Id. at 298–311 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
191 Id. at 292–93 (“[T]he relative ease and cheapness with which an ice plant may be
constructed exposes the industry to destructive and frequently ruinous competition.”).
192 Id. at 292–93, 308.
193 Id. at 307–08 & n.53 (“Economists are searching for the causes of this disorder . . . .
Increasingly, doubt is expressed whether it is economically wise that men should be permitted
to add to the producing facilities of an industry which is already suffering from overcapacity . . . . [Some] assert that through improved methods of manufacture, made possible by
advances in science and invention and vast accumulation in capital, our industries have become capable of producing between 30 percent and 100 percent more than was consumed even
in days of vaunted prosperity and that the present capacity will, for a long time, exceed the
needs of business . . . . And some thoughtful men of wide business experience insist that all
projects for proration and stabilization must prove futile unless, in some way, the equivalent of
the certificate of public convenience and necessity is made a pre-requisite to embarking new
capital in an industry in which capacity already exceeds the production schedules.”).
194 See New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 279 (“The control here asserted does not protect against
monopoly but tends to foster it . . . . There is nothing in the product . . . on which to rest a
distinction, in respect of this attempted control, from other products in common use which
enter into free competition, subject, of course, to reasonable regulations prescribed for the
protection of the public and applied with appropriate impartiality.”).
190
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there are enough dairymen in the business.”195 Such arbitrary interference with basic liberties could not be saved “merely by calling them
experimental.”196
Just a year later, the Court considered the Hoover administration’s
challenge to the Appalachian Coals venture described above.197 The
government had convinced the lower court that the venture was the economic equivalent of cartels and “open price plans” previously condemned as direct, unreasonable restraints.198 The Supreme Court
reversed, however, relying in part on arguments that would be deemed
legitimate today. The venture was not a naked cartel, the Court said, but
instead involved contractual integration between the parties that encouraged research, advertising, and streamlined distribution.199 Moreover, the parties faced competition from new fuels and coal in adjacent
regions.200 As a result, the Court said, the defendants did not have the
sort of market position present in earlier decisions that had condemned
horizontal restraints; a complete merger between the defendants, while
eliminating rivalry, likely would have passed antitrust muster.201 There
was no reason to treat less complete integration more harshly.202
However, the Court also embraced arguments that would, today,
confirm that a challenged arrangement entailed an anticompetitive departure from normal competition.203 For instance, the Court treated the defendants’ desire to eliminate “destructive practices” as redeeming virtues
that could help justify the restraint.204 The Court also suggested that its
analysis turned in part on the deteriorating macroeconomic conditions
195

Id.
Id.
197 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
198 See United States v. Appalachian Coals Co., 1 F. Supp. 339 (W.D. Va. 1932) (enjoining venture’s operation); id. at 345–49 (invoking United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Association 166 U.S. 290 (1897), Joint Traffic Ass’n v. United States, 171 U.S. 505 (1898),
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), Am. Column & Lumber Co.
v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371
(1923), and United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927) in support of decision
enjoining the venture).
199 See Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–68, 376–78 (1933).
200 Id. at 361 (“Coal has been losing markets to oil, natural gas and water power.”); cf.
United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 491, 499 (1974) (affirming district court’s approval of merger in part because coal faced “stiffer competition from oil and natural gas”).
201 See Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 376–77.
202 Id. at 377 (“Nothing in theory or experience indicates that the selection of a common
selling agency to represent a number of producers should be deemed to be more abnormal than
[a merger] bringing various independent units into one ownership. Either may be prompted by
business exigencies.”); cf. B.M.I. v. C.B.S., 441 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1979) (formation and operation
of partnerships literally fixes prices but is properly analyzed under the rule of reason).
203 Cf. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978) (holding
that defendants’ argument assumed that restraint would exercise market power and thus confirmed that challenged practice should be condemned).
204 See Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 366–67.
196
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afflicting local communities.205 These conditions, the Court said, had
inspired formation of the venture, because “the limits of official authority
were apparent.”206 Presumably these limits derived from either or both
the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause, the latter of
which would have prevented individual states from regulating the output
of the multi-state venture’s members.207 That venture, in turn, merely
ameliorated “injurious practices,” which the Court said “demanded correction.”208 According to the Court, the statute did not prevent defendants from “making an honest effort to remove abuses, to make
competition fairer, and thus to promote the essential interests of commerce.”209 Thus, “[t]he interests of producers and consumers were interlinked,” because “when producing concerns fail, when unemployment
mounts and communities dependent upon profitable production are prostrated, the wells of commerce go dry.”210 Absent proof that the venture
produced unreasonable prices—impossible since it had never gone into
operation—no injunction would issue.211 Justice McReynolds, who had
condemned open price plans as involving “methods which are not normal,” issued a lone dissent.212
Early in the Depression, then, the Court had resisted efforts to combat economic downturn by coercive interference with free entry and free
competition. At the same time, however, the same Justices, recognizing
the “limits to official authority” they themselves had imposed under the
aegis of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, approved private restraints that unduly restrained free competition, thereby producing the
same monopolistic results as state-imposed barriers to entry.213 Cracks
had begun to occur in the mutually-enforcing structure that had, to that
point anyway, consistently sheltered free-market competition from undue
state, federal, or private interference.
IV. FDR’S STIMULUS PLAN: THE NIRA
President Roosevelt took office in March, 1933, the same month
that the Court announced the Appalachian Coals decision. The Executive and Legislative Branches immediately began work on legislation to
205

Id. at 364–65.
Id.
207 See supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text (explaining how pre-Depression dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence prevented states from placing direct burdens on interstate commerce, including prices of interstate sales).
208 Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 364–65.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 378 (McReynolds, J. dissenting).
213 Id. at 364–65.
206
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stimulate the economy. In April the Senate passed legislation banning
the interstate sale of any product manufactured by a firm whose employees worked over thirty hours per week.214 FDR’s own Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, supported this approach, so long as a federal board
fixed minimum wages to enhance “purchasing power.”215
Industry and its congressional allies vigorously opposed the control
included in the Senate bill, and FDR doubted it would survive constitutional attack.216 Business leaders argued that industries should themselves determine wages, hours, and output via “industrial selfgovernment.”217 Such “self-government,” of course, would require relaxation of the Sherman Act, even beyond that implied by Appalachian
Coals, something the Chamber of Commerce, National Association of
Manufacturers, and the American Bar Association were now advocating
with renewed vigor.218
Responding to these considerations, Congress passed, and FDR
signed, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in June, 1933. The
NIRA’s “declaration of policy” diagnosed the problem to be addressed as
“widespread unemployment and disorganization of industry,” which
“burdens interstate and foreign commerce, affects public welfare, and
undermines the standard of living of the American people.”219 Thus, the
Act articulated several purposes:
1) Remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate
commerce;
2) Promote the organization of industry for the purpose
of cooperative action among trade groups;
3) Induce united labor action;
4) Eliminate unfair competitive practices;
5) Promote the fullest possible utilization of the productive capacity of industries;
6) Avoid undue restriction of production (except as may
be temporarily required);
214

See HIMMELBERG, supra note 143, at 191–92.
Id. at 190–92 (detailing support by Perkins and others for such measures).
216 HAWLEY, supra note 166, at 22 (“Roosevelt [believed the bill was] seriously defective.
It was far too rigid, likely to be held unconstitutional, and said nothing about minimum
wages.”).
217 Id. at 22–23.
218 Id. (summarizing arguments that “The antitrust laws should be relaxed so as to allow
employers to enter into voluntary trade association agreements covering such things as hours,
wages and ‘destructive competition.’ Such agreements should then be approved by an appropriate government agency, and [then] forced upon recalcitrant industrial minorities . . . .”).
219 See National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 701 (1934), invalidated by Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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7) Increase consumption of industrial and agricultural
products by increasing purchasing power;
8) Reduce unemployment;
9) Improve labor standards; and
10) Otherwise rehabilitate industry and conserve natural
resources.220
The NIRA took two steps toward these objectives. First, Title II
authorized $400 million for public works.221 Second, Title I authorized
the creation of “Codes of Fair Competition,” via a process reminiscent of
the trade practice conferences orchestrated by the FTC during the
1920s.222 Moreover, in considering the merits of proposed codes, the
President or his designee was to consider numerous criteria, including
whether such codes:
1) Promoted monopolies;
2) Eliminated or oppressed small enterprises; or
3) Discriminated against small enterprises.223
The statute also redundantly commanded that “such codes shall not permit monopolies or monopolistic practices.”224
The language proscribing “monopolies or monopolistic practices”
was less friendly to competition than it may initially have appeared. The
initial House bill did not prohibit monopolies.225 The Senate bill, however, prohibited any code “‘permit[ting] combinations in restraint of
trade, price fixing, or other monopolistic practices . . . .’”226 Industry,
however, argued that this language would defeat the legislation’s purpose
by preventing cooperation to stabilize prices and enhance purchasing
power.227 As a result, the House demanded the watered-down prohibition on “monopolies or monopolistic practices.”228 To remove any
doubt, the Act also exempted from antitrust scrutiny “any code, agreement, or license approved, prescribed, or issued and in effect under this
title.”229
220

See 15 U.S.C. Ch. 15, § 702 (1934) (“Declaration of Policy”) (emphasis added).
See 15 U.S.C. Ch. 14, §§ 601–617 (1934).
222 See supra notes 147–55 and accompanying text.
223 See 15 U.S.C. § 703 (a).
224 See id.
225 See HAWLEY, supra note 166, at 29–30.
226 Id.
227 Id. (“Business protests made it clear that [the Senate] was striking at the heart of the
measure, that businessmen were set upon establishing ‘fair, just, and reasonable price levels,’
in consideration of decreased working hours and increased wages.”).
228 Id. at 30–31.
229 See 15 U.S.C. § 705 (1934).
221
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Thus, Congress rejected atomization and nationalization, in favor of
self-regulation approved as “reasonable” in Appalachian Coals and becoming fashionable in Europe.230 Appalachian Coals, of course, was not
the only American antecedent; the FTC had approved “Codes of Fair
Competition” under its trade practice procedure, and the Department of
Justice had, during the Coolidge Administration, declined to challenge
unlawful “open price plans.”231 The Act also contemplated that resulting
codes would expressly guarantee fair wages and reduced working hours,
require participating industries to bargain collectively with labor, and ban
“yellow dog” contracts, which forbid employees from joining a union.232
Indeed, provisions boosting labor prerogatives and income were seen as
working hand-in-hand with industry cartelization. Without such cartelization, it was said, destructive and cutthroat competition would result in
“chiseling” on prices and thus wages.233 By bolstering collective industrial action, then, the Act supposedly facilitated wage increases and
work-spreading practices necessary to enhance labor’s purchasing power
and spark economic recovery.234
Less than two years after FDR signed the law, 550 approved codes
were in operation.235 Industries funneled proposals through their trade
associations, which drew upon the institutional expertise they had developed while devising and enforcing provisions that tempered “cut-throat”
competition during the 1920s.236 The resulting codes were a full-scale
assault on free competition, coercively interfering with market-based re230

See SHAFFER, supra note 90, at 98–104.
See supra notes 146–55 and accompanying text.
232 See 15 U.S.C. Ch. 15, § 707(a) (1934); see also Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions, A
Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 581, 601–04 (2007)
(describing NIRA’s support for collective bargaining).
233 See HIMMELBERG, supra note 143, at 202–05 (detailing business support for self-regulation of prices, wages, and production); id. at 204 (“[B]usiness leaders . . . were able to
persuade [Senator] Wagner that elimination of ‘cutthroat competition’ and improvement of
wages and hours through industry-wide agreements would, together with public works, be an
adequate recovery mechanism.”).
234 Herbert Stein summarized the NIRA’s economic logic as follows:
[T]he thought was that in the twenties too small a share of the national income had
gone to workers and farmers — the consuming classes — and too large a share had
gone to savers. As a result investment had run for a long time at a rate that could not
be sustained by the rate of consumption, and had then collapsed, causing the Depression. The NRA and the AAA were to raise and sustain the share of workers and
farmers and thereby raise and sustain [overall] consumption.
STEIN, supra note 159, at 48–49. See also HIMMELBERG, supra note 143, at 202–05 (“The
labor provisions, on the grounds that they would increase ‘purchasing power,’ made it somewhat possible to regard the N.I.R.A. as a recovery measure, as did the antitrust suspension,
upon the supposition that unfair and ruthless competition was causing continuing deflation of
prices and wages and making revival impossible.”).
235 HIMMELBERG, supra note 143, at 211.
236 See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text; PERITZ, supra note 75, at 78 (“[The
NIRA] would take trade associations as its institutional framework.”).
231
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source allocation in two broad ways. First, the codes fixed prices or
imposed horizontal collusion. Thirty-eight codes set minimum prices.237
Another 188 included “emergency price fixing provisions,” defining
“emergency” as “destructive price cutting” endangering maintenance of
the code.238 Four hundred twenty-two included “open price” provisions,
requiring firms to file prices publicly with code authorities.239 Of these,
297 mandated waiting periods between the filing of new prices and their
effective dates.240 Ninety-five limited output, by capping the number of
hours plants could operate each week, limiting construction, preventing
firms from shifting from one sort of output to another, prohibiting new
plants, or discouraging new routes.241
Code provisions facilitated horizontal collusion in other ways as
well. Eighty mandated resale price maintenance (minimum RPM),
which can facilitate upstream collusion.242 Three hundred fifty-two
banned below-cost sales, regardless of any injury to competition or even
rivals, thereby replicating provisions produced by the FTC’s “trade practice conferences.”243 One hundred codes prohibited “destructive price
cutting,” defined as cuts “impair[ing] code wages and working conditions,” regardless of the prices’ relationship to costs.244 Various codes
banned or limited package sales, which could facilitate secret discounting.245 Others limited the extension of consumer credit, another method
of circumventing cartel agreement; a similar provision had emerged from
FTC trade practice conferences.246 Thus, a leading historian concluded
that “[t]he philosophy of government-supported cartels was clearly outdistancing the concepts of enforcing competition.”247
Second, in addition to cartelization and facilitating practices, which
presumably benefited all firms in a market, many codes contained provisions that likely raised the cost of small rivals and erected barriers to
237

See LEVERETT S. LYON

ET AL.,

THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 579

(1935).
238

Id. at 605–08 & n.18.
Id. at 610–11; see also HAWLEY, supra note 166, at 59–60 (describing these
provisions).
240 LYON ET AL., supra note 237, at 610–11.
241 See id. at 624–29, 636, 634–35 (table detailing various provisions).
242 See HAWLEY, supra note 166, at 58–59 (reporting that eighty codes mandated minimum RPM); Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 51, n.18 (1977) (stating that
“industry-wide” minimum RPM can facilitate upstream horizontal collusion).
243 See LYON ET AL., supra note 237, at 585–86; supra note 152 and accompanying text.
Some codes both prohibited below-cost sales and authorized emergency price fixing. See id. at
605–08.
244 See LYON ET AL., supra note 237, at 603–05.
245 Id. at 690–93.
246 Id. at 691–92; but cf. Catalano v. Target Stores, 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (banning agreement not to extend certain credit terms); see also supra note 152 and accompanying text
(describing such provisions in codes approved by FTC-sponsored trade practice conferences).
247 See HAWLEY, supra note 166, at 62.
239
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entry by others, further undermining free competition and mandating the
sort of inefficiencies Hoover had feared when opposing the Swope
plan.248 As noted earlier, the statute itself required participating firms to
allow collective bargaining.249 Moreover, all codes displaced free competition in labor markets, mandating minimum wages.250 In addition, all
but the fur trapping code set maximum hours.251 Other codes eliminated
late shifts for women, required holiday overtime, or mandated work sharing.252 Each such provision interfered with marketplace determinations
of wages and hours by raising the former and reducing the latter and
thereby distorting firms’ input choices and mandating inefficient production processes. Such mandated inefficiencies likely placed disproportionate burdens on smaller firms engaged in labor-intensive
production.253 For instance, while minimum wages increase production
costs for all firms, they fall disproportionately on labor-intensive firms,
i.e., those using more “person hours” (and less capital) per unit of output
than other firms.254 Thus, minimum wage codes can increase output for
capital-intensive firms while decreasing output for labor-intensive
firms.255
Maximum hour laws can have a similar effect, as illustrated by the
facts of Lochner v. New York, which overturned legislation setting maximum hours for bakers as inconsistent with contractual liberty.256 New
York bakeries nominally subject to the law employed two very different
production technologies. About 90% were small, “mom and pop” operations, differing little from their eighteenth century counterparts.257
248 Id. at 83 (“Small firms often existed only because they offered lower prices to offset
preferences for advertised brands, prices sometimes made possible by lower wages . . . . It was
in the interest of larger firms, therefore, to eliminate price and wage differentials and wipe out
the special advantages that made them possible . . . . The majority of the codes moved in this
direction.”); see generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
249 See 15 U.S.C. § 707 (1934).
250 See LYON ET AL., supra note 237, at 317–42 (detailing minimum wage provisions).
251 Id. at 367, n.a; see also id. at 365–91 (discussing various maximum hour provisions).
252 Id. at 387–91.
253 See Oliver E. Williamson, Wage Rates as Barriers to Entry: The Pennington Case in
Perspective, 82 Q. J. ECON. 85, 91–98 (1968) [hereinafter Williamson, Wage Rates as Barriers
to Entry] (explaining how imposition of minimum wages industry-wide can disadvantage
smaller, labor-intensive firms).
254 Id.
255 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 96 YALE L.J.
at 230, n.73 (invoking Williamson’s work on how minimum wages can raise costs of small
firms to support claim that firms can employ private contracts to impose disproportionate input
costs on rivals).
256 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
257 See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 116–17
(1983); see also id. at 116 (reporting that in 1905 there were 3,164 bakeries in New York, of
which 2,870 were sole proprietorships, 228 were partnerships and sixty-four were
corporations).
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Larger, corporate bakeries employed modern ovens and premises, i.e.,
more capital-intensive production.258 Their employees rarely worked
over sixty hours per week.259 Smaller bakeries countered these advantages with longer hours; employees sometimes slept on the premises and
worked twelve-hour shifts, six days per week.260 By imposing a sixtyhour limit on weekly working hours, New York impelled small employers to hire additional employees to cover resulting shortfalls. This requirement presumably increased the fixed costs of hiring and training,
for instance, and could raise labor costs in other ways as well.261 Presumably maximum hour provisions in NIRA codes had similar effects in
some industries, disadvantaging small, labor-intensive enterprises compared to capital-intensive establishments.
Finally, consider the NIRA’s ban on “yellow dog” contracts, which
contravened two Supreme Court decisions.262 One historian has reported
that, during the 1920s, “users of yellow dog contracts were typically nonunion firms in competitive industries divided into union and nonunion
sectors.”263 Such firms were generally sole-proprietorships, operating at
smaller scale than corporations.264 If so, one might surmise that the results of collective bargaining fell disproportionately on the sole-proprietorships that employed such contracts and resisted unionization.265 Like
small bakeries in Lochner, many such firms presumably employed laborintensive production processes.266 Thus, in the jargon of modern antitrust theory, some yellow dog contracts were “predatory counter-strategies,” countering efforts of unions, perhaps in concert with larger
employers, in order to impose higher labor costs.267
258

Id. at 116–17.
Id. (citing 1896 New York report finding that workday in large bakeries approached
the statutory maximum).
260 Id. (reporting average work week for New York bakers of 72.67 hours, compared to
about sixty hours per week for employees of corporate bakeries).
261 Id. at 117 (suggesting that maximum hour requirement forced employers to hire second group of workers, but at higher hourly wages, to induce them to accept fewer hours per
week employment).
262 See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (voiding state ban on such contracts); Adair
v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (voiding congressional ban on such contracts in railroad
industry).
263 See Daniel Ernst, The Yellow Dog Contract and Liberal Reform, 1917–1932, 30 LAB.
HIST. 251, 256 (1989).
264 Id. at 255 (“According to one study [of firms imposing such contracts] most employed
fewer than 250 workers, and of the 14 firms in a second study, only four employed more than
1000; eight employed between 100 and 320, and the remainder employed fewer than 30.”).
265 See Williamson, Wage Rates as Barriers to Entry, supra note 253, at 91–98.
266 See supra notes 256–61 and accompanying text (explaining how small bakeries burdened by regulations challenged in Lochner likely employed labor-intensive production
processes and thus suffered disproportionately from such regulations).
267 See Williamson, Wage Rates as Barriers to Entry, supra note 265, at 91–92, 98; see
generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L.
REV. 263 (1981); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
259

R
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In the end, then, the NIRA was, at best, a “mixed blessing” for
small business and, at worst, an unmitigated evil. Most prosecutions for
purported code violations targeted small firms,268 and FDR faced a growing chorus of complaints that NIRA codes stacked the economic deck
against small business.269 The fierce resistance by many small businesses to various cost-raising code provisions, as well as the support of
larger firms for such provisions, bolsters this interpretation.
The NIRA was not the only early New Deal recovery measure. The
Agricultural Adjustment Act, for instance, regulated the prices and output of farmers, who had experienced low prices while paying dearly for
manufactured goods.270 The Bituminous Coal Act established the National Bituminous Coal Commission, with authority to approve agreements controlling coal output, and also to impose collectively-bargained
wages upon mining companies.271 Like the NIRA, both statutes sought
to control prices and output to enhance the “purchasing power” of farmers and miners.272
V. NEBBIA

AND THE

RETREAT

OF

ECONOMIC DUE PROCESS

The NIRA and similar state and federal statutes sought coercively to
displace wages and prices set by free-market competition.273 However,
pre-Depression due process precedents barred state-enforced cartelization outside industries “affected by a public interest.”274 Indeed, as explained earlier, in 1932, the Court reaffirmed the basic framework for
analyzing economic regulation in New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann.275
Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 268–72 (1986) (discussing “predatory counter-strategies” against raising rivals’ costs scheme); see also United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 661–69 (1965) (holding that such a conspiracy
would exceed labor’s antitrust immunity and violate the Sherman Act).
268 RUDOLF J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY RHETORIC, LAW
126 (Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 1996) (reporting that of nineteen NIRA district court cases
fourteen involved gas stations, auto dealerships, laundries and dry cleaners, and lumber yards).
269 See Hawley, supra note 166, at 82–83.
270 See Agric. Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31; HAWLEY, supra
note 166, at 191–92 (describing farmers’ support for the same Act).
271 See Brief for Government Officers, Respondents in No. 636 and Petitioners in No. 651
at 3–10, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Nos. 636, 651) (describing history
and purposes of the Act).
272 See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 203–60, United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936) (No. 401); HAWLEY, supra note 166, at 192 (“[Support for the AAA] stressed the
theory that recovery could not be achieved until the balance of market power between agriculture and industry had been restored . . . .”).
273 See infra notes 279–83 and accompanying text (discussing New York’s imposition of
a retail milk cartel); notes 403–31 and accompanying text (discussing California’s imposition
of a raisin cartel).
274 See supra notes 104–14 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 189–96 and accompanying text.
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However, just nine months after passage of the NIRA, the Court
signaled a softening of its protection for economic liberty, in what was,
from one angle, an antitrust case. Nebbia v. New York involved a challenge to regulation like that imposed by numerous NIRA codes, namely,
state-imposed minimum resale price maintenance in the milk industry.276
A grocer sold milk for the state-fixed price of nine cents per quart, but
included a five-cent loaf of bread for free to a consumer who purchased
two quarts.277 This was the sort of package sale—evading a cartel price
by discounting a tied product—that the FTC had occasionally prohibited
via its trade practice conferences and which dozens of NIRA codes
would ban.278
The defendant, indicted for selling cheap and nutritious food,
claimed that the statute deprived him of contractual liberty without due
process because the retail milk business was not “affected by a public
interest.”279 This argument seemed well-grounded in recent decisions in
which the Court had repeatedly opined that the police power did not authorize price regulation of ordinary trades, including dairy farming.280
Nor could it have escaped the Court that a similar arrangement by private
parties governing interstate commerce would have violated the Sherman
Act as a direct, unreasonable restraint of trade.281 Indeed, just four years
later Thurmond Arnold’s antitrust division would secure an indictment
against farmers’ cooperatives, union leaders, city officials, and distributors in the Midwest for fixing milk prices.282 Arnold claimed that the

276 291 U.S. 502 (1934); see supra notes 235–38 and accompanying text (discussing such
resale price fixing in NIRA codes).
277 Id. at 515.
278 See supra text accompanying notes 235–38.
279 See Brief for Nebbia at 10–18, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (No. 531).
280 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 279 (1932) (stating that the state
cannot control entry into ice making or number of cows owned by dairymen); Williams v.
Standard Oil Co. of La., 278 U.S. 235, 240 (1929) (stating that the state cannot set price of
gasoline, “one of the ordinary commodities of trade”); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 357
(1928) (“[An employment agency] deals with the public, but so do the druggist, the butcher,
the baker, [and] the grocer . . . . [A]nything which substantially interferes with employment is
a matter of public concern, but in the same sense that interference with the procurement of
food and housing and fuel are . . . . [I]n none of them is the interest that ‘public interest’ which
the law contemplates as the basis for legislative price control.”); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v.
Kan. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 537 (1923) (“[T]he business of the butcher, or
the baker, the tailor, the wood chopper, the mining operator or the miner [are not] clothed with
such a public interest that the price of his product or his wages could be fixed by state regulation.”). See also Brief for Nebbia, at 10–18 (invoking these and other decisions in support of
due process attack against the regulation).
281 See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911)
(declaring minimum RPM a direct restraint offending Section 1).
282 See HAWLEY, supra note 166, at 435.
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investigation and indictment reduced Chicago milk prices from thirteen
to nine cents a quart.283
The state defended its milk cartel as an “emergency measure” designed to ensure a fair return for dairy farmers, thereby protecting the
longer-term viability of the industry.284 The scheme had been successful, the state argued, increasing milk prices 30% in one year.285 The
state conceded that the free competition protected by the Court’s due
process decisions was generally desirable, but still claimed that the dairy
industry was a public utility, analogous to electricity generation and
water supply.286 As such, the state continued, milk production was affected by a public interest and subject to price regulation.287 In support
of this argument that free competition was sometimes undesirable, the
state quoted, inter alia, Appalachian Coals v. United States,288 a decision
that had validated (private) interference with normal competition for the
proposition that “[r]ealities must dominate the judgment” and that “it is
necessary to consider the economic conditions peculiar to the industry,
the practices which have obtained and other matters practically affecting
the public interest.”289
In a 5–4 decision, a bitterly divided Court upheld New York’s retail
milk cartel.290 The Court conceded that the milk industry was not a
“public utility,” that New York dairymen had received no special privileges, and that there was “no suggestion of any monopoly or monopolistic practice” (aside from those New York imposed).291 Still, the Court
rejected petitioner’s well-grounded claim that industries “affected with a
public interest” necessarily fell into one of these categories.292 Instead,
the Court said, past conclusions that an industry was “affected with a
public interest” were simply restatements of the conclusion that a chal283 Id. at 435–36. See generally United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188 (1939) (reversing
decision dismissing indictment of milk producers).
284 See Brief for Appellee at 11–22, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933) (No. 531)
(summarizing evidence purporting to show that legislation would overcome milk industry
emergency).
285 Id. at 28.
286 Id. at 37 (“Undoubtedly self-regulation of business through free competition is a goal
worthy of considerable sacrifice, but it is not always the preponderant value.”).
287 Id. at 38.
288 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
289 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 284, at 38 (“Public utilities are businesses in which
free competition works out badly, and accordingly they are controlled upon a different
principle.”).
290 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
291 Id. at 531 (conceding these points).
292 Id. at 532–36; cf. Charles Wolff Packing Company v. Court of Indus. Relations of
Kan., 262 U.S. 522, 535–42 (1923) (unanimously articulating principles, repudiated by
Nebbia, defining the category of industries “affected by a public interest” and therefore amenable to price and/or wage regulation).
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lenged regulation fell within the police power.293 To support its claim,
the Court claimed that the seminal case of Munn v. Illinois,294 where the
Court sustained price regulation, did not involve monopolistic practices.295 Munn, however, had expressly invoked the defendants’ participation in an open and notorious cartel to support its conclusion that the
defendants’ “virtual monopoly” was affected with a public interest.296
Given the Nebbia majority’s rejection of precedent, efforts to analogize
the dairy industry to public utilities and firms engaged in monopolistic
practices were beside the point.297 The only pertinent question, the Court
said, was whether New York’s price regulation “may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose.”298
The Court acknowledged that states and the national government
generally encouraged free competition, and that antitrust regulation ensuring such competition had survived liberty of contract challenges.299
Nonetheless, the Court said, the Constitution was entirely agnostic between free competition, and low prices, on the one hand, and state-created cartels, and high prices, on the other.300 According to the Court:
[A] state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to
enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. . . . Whether the free operation of the normal laws
of competition is a wise and wholesome rule for trade
and commerce is an economic question which this court
need not consider or determine.301
293 See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 536 (“The phrase ‘affected with a public interest’ can, in the
nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control
for the public good.”).
294 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
295 Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 532–33 (“Their enterprise could not fairly be called a monopoly,
although it was referred to in the decision as a ‘virtual monopoly.’”).
296 See Munn, 94 U.S. at 131 (finding that the nine firms owning the regulated elevators
agreed on prices and published the resulting prices in local newspapers, with the result that “all
the elevating facilities” in the region were a “virtual monopoly”). See also Munn v. Illinois,
69 Ill. 80, 93 (Ill. 1873), aff’d 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (characterizing defendants as “an organized
combination of monopolists”); id. at 89 (describing the defendants as “an organized body of
monopolists, possessing sufficient strength . . . to impose their own terms upon the producers
and the shippers of these cereals . . . .”).
297 See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 531–37.
298 Id. at 537.
299 Id. at 538.
300 Id. at 537–38.
301 Id. at 537 (quoting Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 337 (1904)).
Northern Sec. Co. noted that Congress could allow monopoly, not that Congress could coercively impose it. See Northern Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 336.
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Thus, the Court said that states could coercively eliminate competition
whenever they believed competition did not safeguard consumer interests, produced waste harming the public, threatened eventually to cut off
the supply of a public necessity, or portended destruction of the industry.302 Such power, the Court said, included the power to fix prices, particularly when “the economic maladjustment is one of price, which
threatens harm to the producer at one end of the series and the consumer
at the other.”303 The Court did not explain how fixing retail prices would
impact milk prices upstream.304 Nor did the Court consider the possibility that normal competition would eliminate inefficient producers and
stabilize prices over time or explain why malnourished families should
pay a premium to protect inefficient producers.305 Simply put, the
Nebbia Court’s disingenuous treatment of prior decisions and absence of
reasoned explanation signaled a retreat from the Court’s prior protection
for contractual liberty and thus free-market competition.306 Just as Appalachian Coals had validated unreasonable private restraints on free competition, Nebbia approved state-imposed restraints that could have
similar effects.
VI. SCHECHTER POULTRY

AND THE

NIRA’S DEMISE

Four New York small businessmen were prosecuted for competing
too much, thus violating the NIRA’s “Live Poultry Code.”307 The defendants and their two corporations were convicted on eighteen counts,
including:308
1) Allowing customers to select individual chickens
from a coop or half coop, i.e., failing to “bundle” desirable with undesirable chickens;
2) Failure to report prices to code authorities weekly;
3) Failure to abide by minimum wage and maximum
hour provisions;
302

See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 538.
Id. at 538–39.
304 Id. at 556–57 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (noting the absence of such an
explanation).
305 Id. at 557–58 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (“[The statute] takes away the liberty of
12,000,000 consumers to buy a necessity of life in an open market. It imposes direct and
arbitrary burdens upon those already seriously impoverished with the alleged immediate design of affording special benefits to others . . . . A superabundance; but no child can purchase
from a willing storekeeper below the figure appointed by three men at headquarters!”).
306 See CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 71, at 78–83 (contending that Nebbia marked a turning point in Court’s economic liberty jurisprudence).
307 See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 519 (1935).
308 Id. at 527–28.
303
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4) Selling a butcher one unfit chicken.309
The businessmen appealed their convictions, leveling three challenges to the statute, one facial and two as-applied.310 The facial attack
invoked the non-delegation doctrine, challenging the statute’s delegation
of the power to the President to approve and transform proposed codes
into law. The petitioners argued that the statute gave the President carte
blanche to define unfair trade practices, without providing an “intelligible principle” to guide his regulatory discretion.311
In the alternative, petitioners also claimed the application of the Act
to them exceeded Congress’s commerce power. The Live Poultry Code
governed “every person” in the industry, regardless of connection to interstate commerce.312 Moreover, the Government conceded that the statute applied to acts only slightly impacting interstate commerce.313 Other
codes regulated barber shops, bowling and billiards, and burlesque theatres.314 Substantial precedent, petitioners correctly explained, established that production—and wages and hours of manufacturing
employees—only affected commerce “indirectly,” such that regulation of
wages and hours exceeded congressional authority.315
Most relevant for competition policy, petitioners argued that the
Live Poultry Code’s provisions, which displaced free-market determination of wages and hours, abridged contractual liberty without due process.316 Freedom of contract was the general rule317 and neither
Congress nor the Executive Branch had found that the poultry industry
was clothed with a public interest or established any “peculiar necessity”
for regulation.318
The United States responded that this delegation was similar to that
approved in other contexts.319 Moreover, the government claimed that
interference with free-market determination of wages and hours would
prevent a downward spiral of wage rates that would otherwise occur as
309

Id. at 528.
See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N.H., 546 U.S. 320, 329–31 (2006) (articulating
distinction between as applied and facial challenges).
311 See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405–07 (1928) (articulating non-delegation doctrine).
312 See Brief for Petitioners at 72–74, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (Nos. 854, 856).
313 Id. at 73–74 (quoting statements in Government’s brief to this effect).
314 Id. at 80–82.
315 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 312, at 102–03; 110–17 (quoting and citing Kidd
v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888), E.C. Knight v. United States, 156 U.S. 1 (1895), and similar
decisions).
316 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 312, at 147.
317 Id. at 147–48 (citing Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 178 (1908)).
318 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 312, at 148.
319 See Brief for the United States at 118–136, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (Nos. 854, 856).
310
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firms sought to obtain a competitive advantage.320 According to the
United States, stemming this spiral would remove obstructions of commerce and provide the “stimulus to start in motion the cumulative forces
making for expanding commercial activity.”321
The Government invoked recent relaxation of antitrust regulation
and concomitant departure from free-market norms to support its claim
that regulation could stimulate the macro economy. The Government
claimed that “fair competition,” not free competition, was a “familiar
concept . . . recognized . . . in the formulation of codes of fair competition in [FTC] trade practice conferences.”322 The Government quoted
Appalachian Coals for the proposition that price fixing ultimately benefits consumers by ensuring fair returns for businesses.323 In a nod to the
1920s trade association movement, the Government suggested that industrial concentration and “well-organized industry with well-organized
labor support may maintain fair prices and fair wages,” without any relaxation of the antitrust laws.324 Still, the NIRA was necessary because a
well-organized industry maintaining reasonable prices would “steadily
lose its market,” i.e., as “low wages in [less organized] industries reduced general purchasing power.”325 Moreover, particular industries
might find it difficult to organize, because “a minority would have taken
advantage of the situation and blocked the possibility of voluntary cooperative action.”326 Invoking Nebbia, the government claimed that no category of activity was automatically beyond the scope of Congress’s
Commerce Power.327 Thus, the government’s defense of the NIRA as320 Id. at 47–57, 53–54, 87, 90 (“As prices and wages are cut by individual employers or
groups of employers, others in self-preservation are compelled to do the same. The process
tends to repeat itself at constantly lower and lower levels.”).
321 Id. at 91 (“A reduction in hours of labor . . . distributes wage payments among a larger
number of workers [increasing] the proportion of such payments promptly spent.”); id. at 86
(“The justification under the commerce clause for particular provisions in the codes may be
based in part upon their relation to the revival of business and commerce.”).
322 Id. at 121 (citing FTC, Trade Practice Conference (1933)).
323 Id. at 91–92. In particular, the government contended as follows:
The interrelation of the various phases of our commercial system, particularly
marked in a time of severe stress, has been clearly recognized by this Court. Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 372: “The interests of producers and consumers are interlinked. When industry is grievously hurt, when producing concerns fail, when
unemployment mounts and communities dependent upon profitable production are
prostrated, the wells of commerce go dry.” The problem, in short, was not confined
to production or distribution or consumption, but was concerned with the interrelation of all these aspects. . . .
Id.
324 See id. at 93.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 75; id. at vi (citing Nebbia favorably five times).
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sumed that economy-wide cartelization would counteract the Depression,
consistent with the rationale of Appalachian Coals.328
The Court reversed the Schechters’ convictions on two separate
grounds. First, the Court declared Title II unconstitutional on its face,
because it delegated excessive legislative authority to the President.329
The “fair competition” imposed by the codes, the Court said, was more
than the antithesis of “unfair competition” banned by the common law or
the FTC Act.330 The statute empowered the President to adopt, “wise
and beneficent measures for the government of trades and industries in
order to bring about rehabilitation, correction, and development.”331
However, unlike previous delegations, “the statute contained no standards aside from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion.”332
The Court also struck down the NIRA “as applied” to the defendants. Although the defendants imported the poultry from other states, the
challenged code did not govern the interstate transportation of poultry.333
Thus, defendants’ local resale of poultry was not in the “current” of interstate commerce.334 Nor did these activities substantially affect interstate commerce. While defendants’ wages and hours affected their
prices, income and thus the income of their rivals, the same was also true
for defendants’ “number of employees, rents, advertising, methods of doing business, etc.”335 Whatever effect either or both the defendants’
wages and hours might have on interstate commerce was merely indirect
and local, within the exclusive jurisdiction of states.336 Recognition of
such authority, the Court said, would empower Congress, at its discretion, to regulate purely local matters.337 While recognizing that it was
not “the province of the Court to consider the economic advantages or
disadvantages of such a centralized system,” the Justices held that “the
Federal Constitution does not provide for it.”338 Shortly thereafter, the
Court invalidated the wage-fixing provisions of the Bituminous Coal
Act, holding that such regulation exceeded Congress’s power, because
the mining and sale of coal had only an indirect effect on interstate com328 Id. at 91–92; see also id. at 4 (citing Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344
(1933), with approval); Brief of Government Officers in No. 636 at vi (five favorable citations
of Appalachian Coals), Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Nos. 636, 651).
329 See Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529–42 (1935).
330 Id. at 534.
331 Id. at 535.
332 Id. at 541.
333 Id. at 520–21.
334 Id.
335 Id. at 548–49.
336 Id. at 549–50.
337 Id. at 546.
338 Id. at 549.
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merce.339 Here again the government’s invocation of Nebbia and Appalachian Coals fell on deaf ears.340 Earlier the same term the Court also
invalidated portions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.341
VII.

THE NIRA REDUX: POST-SCHECHTER INTERFERENCE
WITH FREE COMPETITION

Schechter, of course, meant revival of the Sherman Act for industries previously operating under NIRA codes. Indeed, under the leadership of Thurman Arnold, the Antitrust Division reinvigorated
enforcement, previously undermined by trade practice conferences, Appalachian Coals, the NIRA, and lax enforcement during the Coolidge
Administration. This revival of “free competition” as the principle animating the antitrust statutes seemingly paved the way for restoration of
free competition “across the board” as the principle governing the nation’s regulatory policy. Nonetheless, and despite antitrust’s example to
the contrary, state and national efforts to displace free competition with
regulatory dictates thrived, albeit in different guises. Through it all, the
Supreme Court has stood idly by, and some modern Justices have even
criticized their predecessors’ protection of free markets from anticompetitive state interference.
A. Antitrust Unleashed and Free Competition Restored
Within three years of Schechter, FDR had appointed zealous trustbuster Thurman Arnold to run the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice.342 The number of cases brought by the United States increased seven-fold, including cases against firms that simply adhered to
code provisions that Schechter had rendered defunct.343 Moreover, by
1940, the Supreme Court had announced that “free competition,” and not
“reasonable prices” was the central object of the Sherman Act, thereby
339

See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
See Brief for Government Officers Respondents in No. 636, and Petitioners in No. 651
at vi–vii, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Nos. 636, 651) (table of authorities)
(noting fourteen favorable citations of Nebbia).
341 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (voiding Agricultural Adjustment Act’s
processing tax as contrary to the Tenth Amendment).
342 SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 78–110 (2005)
(describing Arnold’s tenure at the Antitrust Division); see also John D. Harkrider, Lessons
from the Great Depression, 23 ANTITRUST, no. 2, Spring 2009, at 6, 8–9 (discussing postNIRA antitrust enforcement by the Roosevelt Administration).
343 See Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON.
365, 366 (1970); Daniel Crane, The Story of United States v. Socony-Vacuum: Hot Oil and
Antitrust in the Two New Deals, in ANTITRUST STORIES 91, 91 (D. A. Crane & E. M. Fox eds.,
2007).
340
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repudiating the logic of Appalachian Coals and the FTC’s trade practice
conferences.344
Indeed, over the next few decades the enforcement agencies and the
Court equated “free competition” with “atomistic rivalry,” unconstrained
by non-standard contracts.345 Tying contracts, maximum resale price
maintenance, exclusive dealing arrangements, vertically-imposed exclusive territories, and restraints ancillary to the formation of legitimate ventures—all became unlawful per se or nearly so.346 Explaining this
approach, the Court asserted that “unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress.”347 Thus,
the Court expanded antitrust regulation of private parties in an effort to
make the economy more “competitive,” equating “competition” with atomization.348 In so doing, the Court banned restraints that often overcame market failures and thus enhanced economic welfare, at least
according to modern economic theory.349 Indeed, banning such restraints sometimes protected inefficient firms from those that had devised
more efficient ways of doing business.350 At the time, however, the
Court’s approach was consistent with then-prevailing economic theory,
which offered no beneficial explanation for non-standard agreements and
thus interpreted such arrangements as efforts to protect or obtain market
power.351 Society would have to await the evolution of “more accurate
economic conceptions” before courts would reverse course and validate
non-standard agreements that create wealth.352

344 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221, 223 (1940) (banning
horizontal price fixing regardless of reasonableness by rejecting a “reasonable price” defense
as “wholly alien to a system of free competition” and condemning defendants’ practices because they thwarted “determination of . . . prices by free competition alone”).
345 See Meese, Price Theory, Competition, supra note 80, at 127–34.
346 Id. at 124–30 (discussing various decisions during this period). More extreme examples include: United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (per se ban on exclusive
territories ancillary to beneficial joint venture); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)
(per se ban on vertically imposed maximum retail price maintenance (RPM)); FTC v. Brown
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966) (banning quasi-exclusive dealing agreement binding 1% of all
national shoe retailers).
347 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
348 See Meese, Price Theory, Competition, supra note 80, at 127–34.
349 See id. at 134–44.
350 See generally Topco, 405 U.S. 596 (banning exclusive territories imposed ancillary to
joint venture among independent grocery chains despite the trial court’s undisputed finding
that the venture produced no harm and facilitated interbrand rivalry between members of the
venture and much larger grocery chains).
351 See Meese, Price Theory, Competition, supra note 80, at 115–23.
352 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55, 58–59 (1911) (indicating that
courts should revise antitrust doctrine in light of evolving “economic conceptions”).
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B. Nebbia Confirmed: The Death of Economic Due Process
While post-Schechter antitrust decisions protected free competition
from private interference, the Court refused to safeguard such competition from state infringement. Just two years after Schechter, the Court,
in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, overruled binding precedent to sustain a
minimum wage law, confirming Nebbia’s implicit repudiation of previous decisions protecting economic liberty.353 Soon thereafter the Court
would reconfirm the death of due process protection for economic liberty, sustaining federal legislation that destroyed interstate commerce in
a wholesome product because the national government invoked a “rational basis” for the legislation.354 Police power limitations that had
once protected free competition from unjustified coercive interference
had disappeared.
C. Schechter’s Limited Influence
Aside from its revitalization of the antitrust laws, Schechter’s victory for free-market competition was narrow and short-lived. The decision did not eliminate industry’s appetite, irrespective of economic
conditions, for protection from rivalry.355 Moreover, neither of the decision’s rationales, nor Thurman Arnold’s prosecutorial zeal, could prevent
anti-competitive regulation as such.356 For instance, the “non-delegation” holding did not prevent Congress or states from imposing anti-competitive regulations via legislation, or, at the state level, delegations to an
executive.357 The non-delegation doctrine, to the extent it has survived,358 merely controls how the national government goes about imposing anti-competitive restrictions and not whether it may do so.
Schechter’s Commerce Clause holding had an application both narrower and broader than the non-delegation rationale. On the one hand,
the holding did not preclude regulation that directly restrained the normal
353 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING Lochner, supra note 104,
at 70–71 (recounting death of liberty of contract in West Coast Hotel).
354 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (sustaining ban on
the interstate shipment of “filled milk” against due process and equal protection attacks); see
also Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397,
398–99 (finding purported justification for the challenged regulation “patently bogus”).
355 Recall in this connection that private industry was adopting cartel-facilitating “open
price plans” and lobbying against antitrust challenges to such plans during the 1920s, when
unemployment approached 3%. See supra notes 88, 142–56 and accompanying text.
356 See supra note 342 (collecting authorities discussing Arnold’s tenure at the Antitrust
Division).
357 The Constitution, of course, does not impose a “non-delegation doctrine” on the states.
358 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 423 (1944) (upholding delegation to
the “Office of Price Administration” to set “fair and equitable” prices).
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flow of interstate commerce.359 The decision did not, therefore, prevent
Congress from imposing cartels in, say, the interstate sale of pipe, interstate transportation, or interstate purchase and/or sale of agricultural
products.360 Moreover, Schechter did not prevent states from creating
purely local cartels, subject only to due process limitations. At the same
time, the Commerce Clause holding placed restrictions upon Congress
itself, and thus was not subject to a legislative fix. Thus, while Nebbia
and its progeny liberated Congress from any due process constraints,
Schechter seemingly limited the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority to impose unreasonable restraints in the first place. While
states retained plenary authority to regulate intrastate commerce, the
threat that citizens might migrate to other states presumably deterred
states from enacting some wealth-reducing legislation.361
However, the Court soon abandoned any meaningful limits on Congress’s Commerce power. Just two years after Schechter, in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,362 the Court jettisoned a fundamental
tenet of Schechter and pre-Depression Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
namely, the distinction between manufacturing, subject only to regulation by individual states, and actual commerce between the states.363 In
particular, Jones & Laughlin Steel held that Congress could prevent a
firm whose output was consumed in other states from interfering with the
formation of a union, reasoning that Congress could encourage union
formation to minimize industrial strife.364 Moreover, while the decision
involved a giant multi-state steel company, the Court simultaneously sustained Congress’s authority to regulate the employment practices of one
of the Nation’s several hundred clothing companies—with a single factory—ostensibly “for the reasons stated in [Jones & Laughlin Steel].”365
This breakdown of the distinction between manufacturing and commerce
vastly expanded federal power over economic activity and, for instance,
359 See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 397–98 (1905) (Sherman Act reached
purchasers’ collusion that depressed livestock prices in the stream of commerce to and from
Chicago); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (Sherman Act
banned multi-state cartel’s collusion setting prices of pipe manufactured in one state and delivered in another).
360 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); Swift & Co., 196 U.S. at 397–398.
361 See, e.g., Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868) (states may not penalize a citizen’s
departure from the state); Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 149 (1992).
362 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
363 See supra note 315 and accompanying text collecting decisions announcing this distinction. See also A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 at 542–44,
548–50 (relying upon this same distinction).
364 See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 34–41.
365 See NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75 (1937).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-2\CJP202.txt

308

CORNELL JOURNAL

unknown

OF

LAW

AND

Seq: 54

PUBLIC POLICY

28-APR-14

12:55

[Vol. 23:255

encouraged the formation of union labor cartels throughout the nation,
thereby displacing free-market competition in wage setting.366
D. Congress Unbound
Congress embraced the sort of unprecedented power that Nebbia,
West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin Steel recognized. Even before
1937, the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 required a license from the Interstate Commerce Commission to carry goods or provide bus service in
interstate commerce; the Commission would also issue binding tariffs
and review applications to start or abandon routes.367 While the Commission had exercised similar authority over railroads since its formation
in 1887, its new authority over trucks and busses contravened pre-Nebbia
case law limiting such regulation to industries “affected with a public
interest,” a category excluding these unconcentrated industries characterized by easy entry and whose participants had not historically received
special privileges.368 Moreover, to buttress this anti-competitive regulation, the 1948 Reed-Bullwinkle Act provided antitrust immunity for horizontal price fixing by carriers who were members of “rate bureaus” if the
Commission approved such agreements.369
In 1938, Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act, creating a
“Civil Aeronautics Authority” empowered to regulate air fares and evaluate carriers’ applications to initiate new routes.370 Moreover, the
Robinson-Patman Act of 1935—still intact—prohibited price discrimination that was not justified by (narrowly-defined) cost considerations.371
National securities exchanges fixed commissions governing the purchase
and sale of securities and found shelter in the implied immunity the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provided.372 The 1937 Miller-Tydings
366 See United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941) (indicating that
Congress may ban unfair labor practices by firms producing for interstate commerce regardless
of volume of production); see also Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the
Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 504 (1997) (“[C]ontrary to the very recent
decisions in Schechter Poultry and Carter Coal, a bare majority of the same Court now [in
Jones & Laughlin Steel] upheld the power of Congress to regulate the terms and conditions of
employment in manufacturing.”).
367 Pub. L. No. 74-255, §§ 206(a), 217(a), 49 Stat. 543 (1935).
368 Cf. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. 290, 335 (invoking railroads’
“public character” and “privileges and franchises” including delegated eminent domain power,
as justifying congressional decision to ban horizontal restraints regardless of the reasonableness of the rate set).
369 See ch. 491, sec. 5, § 5(a), 62 Stat. 472 (1948); see also N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v.
ICC, 666 F.2d 1087, 1095 n.3 (7th Cir. 1982) (describing the three-decade evolution of this
legislation).
370 Pub. L. No. 75-76, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
371 Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (1935) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13).
372 See Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 691 (1975) (holding that collusive commission
setting was immune from antitrust attack given implied repeal of the Sherman Act).
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Act empowered states to immunize minimum resale price maintenance
from Sherman Act scrutiny, whenever goods governed by such agreements faced “free and open competition” from other products, even if the
restraint was unreasonable.373 Congress expanded the exemption in
1952, empowering manufacturers and retailers to enforce such agreements against recalcitrant retailers who declined to participate.374
Again in 1937, Congress enacted the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, empowering the Secretary of Agriculture to enforce “marketing agreements and orders” limiting output and raising prices in various
agricultural sectors.375 In 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) set
minimum wages for any business that manufactured goods for interstate
shipment.376 In 1945, Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempting the “business of insurance” from federal antitrust laws, after the
Supreme Court condemned price fixing in the interstate sale of insurance.377 The same statute empowered states to exclude from their territories insurance companies based in other states, a result otherwise
contrary to the dormant Commerce Clause.378 Finally, both before and
after the New Deal, Congress enacted antitrust exemptions for activities
as disparate as financial aid, medical school resident matching, soft drink
distribution, and sports broadcasting.379
Then there was the NLRA, expressly designed to increase the
“purchasing power” of labor, sustained and applied expansively in Jones

373 See District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937); see also
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 378–79 (1977) (summarizing history and rationale of Miller-Tydings Act).
374 See Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 632 (1952); SULLIVAN, supra
note 373, at 378–39 (describing Act’s rationale).
375 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-137, ch. 296, 50 Stat.
246 (1937).
376 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
377 See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006) et seq; see also United States v. S.-E. Underwriters
Ass’n., 322 U.S. 533, 553–56 (1944). The exemption applies only when a state regulates the
company asserting the exemption, regardless of the regulation’s stringency. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1012(b) (2006); FTC v. Nat’l Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958) (mere adoption of legislative provisions without meaningful enforcement exempts companies from federal antitrust regulation); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 732 (2005) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY] (reaching
the same conclusion). Moreover, the statute does not immunize “acts of boycott, coercion or
intimidation.”); see 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (2006).
378 See 15 U.S.C. § 1011, § 1012(a) (2006); W & S Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of California, 451 U.S. 648, 652–55 (1981) (McCarran-Ferguson Act empowers states to
discriminate against out-of-state insurance companies even though this result would otherwise
offend the dormant Commerce Clause); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
379 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 378
(2007) (collecting these and other antitrust exemptions).
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& Laughlin Steel.380 While Congress had previously exempted collective bargaining from the antitrust laws,381 the NLRA went further and
displaced free-market competition in wage setting by forcing private sector firms to bargain with unions.382 The number of workers represented
by labor cartels soon more than doubled, to nearly 30% of the workforce
by 1940.383 “Strike days” also doubled, to 28 million, between 1936 and
1937, an odd result under a statute justified as an effort to reduce work
stoppages.384 Like other anti-competitive statutory schemes, the NLRA
would co-exist with ever more intrusive antitrust regulation imposing atomistic competition on private businesses, thereby highlighting the new
and stark divergence between the legal regimes governing public “regulation” and private restraints, respectively.385 When Thurman Arnold
unsuccessfully sought to limit labor overreaching by attacking secondary
boycotts that undermined free competition even further, one labor leader
called him “the greatest enemy of . . . American labor” and FDR replaced
him shortly thereafter.386
Each of these statutes displaced free competition in one or more
markets. Some simply revived NIRA-like codes on an industry-by-industry basis. Airlines, for instance, had labored under a code requiring
prior approval before operation of a new route,387 while another code
required approval of new bus and truck routes and tariffs.388 Moreover,
the Robinson-Patman Act revived a modified anti-price discrimination
regime previously found in the FTC’s trade practice conference codes
and then under the NIRA codes.389 Finally, the NLRA simply extended
the NIRA’s requirement that firms bargain collectively with employees,
380 See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, c.372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)); id. § 151 (finding that absence of
collective bargaining reduces purchasing power).
381 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
382 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44 (1937) (describing statute’s requirement that companies bargain with employees’ elected representatives).
383 See Harold Cole & Lee Ohanian, New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great
Depression, 112 J. POL. ECON. 779, 785 (2004).
384 Id. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41–43 (1937).
385 See supra notes 367, 369–79 and accompanying text.
386 WALLER, supra note 342, at 105.
387 See LYON ET AL., supra note 237, at 634–35.
388 Id. (routes); see also WILLIAM H. WAGNER, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MOTOR
CARRIER ACT, 1935 (1935) (explaining that a NIRA Code had imposed a “loose form of Federal regulation” on motor carriers).
389 See supra notes 148, 218, 371 and accompanying text. As explained earlier, anti-price
discrimination rules adopted by the FTC’s trade practice conferences generally dispensed with
any requirement that discrimination injure competition. See supra notes 148, 152 and accompanying text. By contrast, the Robinson-Patman Act required proof that discrimination substantially lessened competition. But see Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685
(1967) (injury to rival established requisite harm to competition), overruled by Brooke Grp.
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
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while the FLSA, like most NIRA codes, imposed minimum wages.390
Both the NLRA and FLSA, of course, coercively displaced the wages
otherwise set by free competition.
E. Approving Anticompetitive State Restraints on Interstate
Commerce
One might have taken comfort from the fact that, with respect to
interstate commerce, a category that expanded significantly in 1937,
Congress, but not individual states, was empowered to displace competition according to then-current precedent. For, unlike individual states,
Congress (and the President), would represent the entire country, and
thus hopefully consider all the costs and benefits of proposed legislation.
This, after all, was the rationale for authorizing Congress to regulate interstate commerce, articulated by James Wilson, for instance.391 Indeed,
a unanimous Court had invoked this rationale in 1899, in Addyston Pipe
and Steel Co. v. United States, holding that Congress could reach private
price fixing agreements that directly restrain interstate trade.392 The
Court apparently assumed, consistent with the legislative history of the
Sherman Act, that Congress’s power over direct restraints of interstate
commerce was exclusive.393 If Congress did not possess such authority,
the Court said, such power would devolve to individual states, which
might regulate cartels according to their “particular interest.”394 In fact,
Gibbons v. Ogden, which Addyston Pipe invoked, suggested that the
Commerce Clause had a “dormant” component that ipso facto prevents
states from imposing anticompetitive restrictions on interstate commerce,
390

See supra notes 376, 382 and accompanying text.
According to Wilson:
Whatever object of government is confined, in its operation and effects, within the
bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to the government of
that state; whatever object of government extends, in its operation or effects, beyond
the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to the government
of the United States.
James Wilson, Speech in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 21, 1787), reprinted in
DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 424 (Jonathon Elliot ed., 2d ed.,
Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1888).
392 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
393 See Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L. J. 375, 379
(1982) (recounting Sherman’s belief that state and national jurisdiction over intrastate and
interstate restraints was mutually exclusive).
394 The Court said:
If . . . Congress has no power and the state legislatures have full and complete
authority to thus far regulate interstate commerce by means of their control over
private contracts . . . then the legislation of the different states might and probably
would be different . . . according to what each state might regard as its own particular interest.
Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 231–32.
391
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there a state-imposed monopoly over interstate steamship travel.395
Moreover, shortly before the Depression, the Court had invalidated state
price fixing of exports.396
Indeed, the Court’s expansion of Congress’s commerce power
placed formerly intrastate commerce squarely within Congress’s jurisdiction, a fact that the Supreme Court confirmed in Sherman Act decisions
banning private intrastate cartels.397 Thus, it seemed that, regardless of
whether Congress acted, the dormant Commerce Clause would thwart
analogous state efforts to displace free-market outcomes by creating monopolies or cartels selling output in what was now deemed interstate
commerce. If “direct restraints” of interstate shipping traffic or electricity exported from one state to another offended the dormant Commerce
Clause, why not “direct restraints” of other commerce now deemed interstate and thus within Congress’s jurisdiction?398
Unfortunately, this pro-competitive potential was never realized.
Congress, as already seen, often displaced normal competition with anticonsumer “regulations.”399 Less well-known, however, is the propensity
of the post-1937 Supreme Court to remove substantive and procedural
limitations on states’ authority to regulate interstate commerce.400 For
instance, the Court radically altered the standards governing state restraints on such commerce, including restraints displacing competition in
favor of monopoly and cartelization.401 Parker v. Brown, a case rarely
discussed by constitutional scholars but well-known in the antitrust community, exemplified this reallocation of authority between states and the
national government.402
In Parker, the Court considered the validity of a raisin cartel, imposed pursuant to California’s 1933 Agricultural Prorate Act.403 Califor395 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (holding that federal statute preempted a state-imposed monopoly
over interstate steamship travel); id. at 197-209 (opining in dicta that the Commerce Clause
preempts such state enactments even absent federal legislation); see also Addyston Pipe, 175
U.S. at 227–28 (invoking Gibbons’ account of the commerce power).
396 See cases cited supra note 82 and accompanying text discussing and collecting cases
to this effect; see also Pub. Util. Comm’n of R. I. v. Attleboro Steam and Electric Co., 273
U.S. 83 (1927) (voiding state regulation of the price of exported electricity).
397 See, e.g., United States v. Employing Plasterers Association, 347 U.S. 186 (1954)
(“That wholly local business restraints can produce the effects condemned by the Sherman Act
is no longer open to question.”); Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar, 334 U.S.
219 (1948) (finding that local beet buyers’ cartel violated Section 1).
398 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). See also supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text (recounting various decisions banning, under the dormant Commerce Clause, anticompetitive state regulation of interstate commerce).
399 See supra notes 367–90 and accompanying text.
400 See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the
States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 289 (1997).
401 See id. at 506–32.
402 See 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
403 See id. at 344.
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nia was the nation’s only producer of raisins, 95% of which were
exported to other states or foreign countries.404 The cartel thus provided
a classic exemplar of the Addyston Pipe Court’s prediction that states left
free to regulate interstate commerce would do so according to their
interest.405
A dissenting producer challenged the cartel.406 A due process challenge would have been futile, given the Court’s evisceration, beginning
with Nebbia, of such doctrinal protection for economic liberty.407 Instead, the petitioner invoked another source of market-protective law, arguing that California’s cartel contravened the dormant Commerce Clause
and the Sherman Act.408
California argued vigorously that forced cartelization of the raisin
market was necessary to prevent “ruinous competition” and thereby ensure producers fair returns.409 To bolster its argument, the state devoted
over a page of its brief to a quote from Appalachian Coals, contending
that the situation facing raisin growers was gravely aggravated by comparison.410 The state also quoted Nebbia for the proposition that spreading the “surplus burden” among various producers was an “essential prerequisite to stabilization.”411
The Court ordered additional briefing and reargument, inviting the
United States to submit a brief as amicus curiae.412 The resulting brief,
co-authored by Thurman Arnold, then leading an aggressive revival of
antitrust enforcement, treated the Sherman Act and the dormant Commerce Clause as symbiotic, with each banning similar conduct. According to Arnold, California’s raisin cartel violated both the dormant
Commerce Clause and the Sherman Act, the latter of which, he said,
enforced the former.413 The brief argued that there could “hardly be a
clearer case of monopolization of interstate and foreign commerce,” and
that it was “beyond dispute” that “the Sherman Act condemns this kind
404

See id. at 345.
See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 231–32 (1899).
406 Parker, 317 U.S. at 348–50.
407 CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 71, at 78–83 and accompanying text.
408 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 349–50.
409 See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 24, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (No. 46)
(“The ruinous effect of surpluses on price levels is well known.”); id. at 26 (“The mere knowledge that these accumulated surpluses exists beyond question makes a buyer’s market and
depresses prices to ruinous levels.”).
410 See id. at 24–25.
411 Id. at 28.
412 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 357.
413 See Brief for the United States in Parker, at 53–91, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (No. 46).
405
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of a price fixing arrangement.”414 Congress plainly had the authority “to
supersede all state legislation in a field it intends to occupy,”415 and had
“exercised all the power it possessed” when passing the Sherman Act.416
The government also invoked earlier holdings that states could not authorize private parties to engage in conduct that would otherwise violate
the Act.417 The United States concluded that there was no reason to believe that Congress had, despite the Sherman Act’s general language,
empowered states to authorize the very cartels the Act condemned.418
The only exception, the government said, might apply where a challenged statute was truly a police regulation, a “true conservation measure,” and not a cartel masquerading as one.419 California’s scheme, by
contrast, “eliminat[ed] competition on a scale irreconcilable with the
very essence of the Sherman Act, the preservation of commercial
competition.”420
The government noted that “the test . . . for determining the compatibility of state laws with the Sherman Act is very similar to that which
[the] Court has invoked” to determine whether a state’s displacement of
competition violated the dormant Commerce Clause.421 Thus, the brief
continued, “[t]he Sherman Act may thus be regarded as a Congressional
affirmation of the constitutional doctrine that national interstate commercial interests are not subject to restrictive state legislation.”422 The Act
could preempt state law and achieve this objective without punishing
state officials, the United States said.423 Arnold seemed to be on solid
ground given pre-Depression case law, such as Gibbons v. Ogden, which
414 Id. at 55–56; see also id. at 65 (“A state legislative program eliminating competition
on such a scale is irreconcilable with the very essence of the Sherman Act, the preservation of
commercial competition in interstate industries.”).
415 Id. at 61.
416 Id. (quoting Apex Hoisery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1941)).
417 See id. at 60–62 (discussing Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,
344–46 (1904)).
418 See id. at 60–61. See also id. at 62 (“To recognize any such limitation upon the scope
of the Congressional enactment would be to open the door wide to state action destructive of
the salutary principle that competition, not combination, should be the law of trade.”) (alteration in original).
419 Id. at 63–64 (“Congress . . . did not intend to deprive the states of their normal ‘police’
powers over business and industry.”). See also supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text
(describing case law, derived from Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851) empowering
states to adopt “indirect” regulations of interstate commerce that ordinarily fell within the
police power).
420 Brief for the United States in Parker, supra note 413, at 65 (alteration in original).
421 Id. at 65–66.
422 Id. at 66 (alteration in original).
423 Id. at 61; cf. Union Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941) (enjoining city’s subsidy to railroad as contrary to federal statute prohibiting any person, including municipalities, from subsidizing shippers).
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banned private and public restraints that produced monopoly or its
consequences.424
Still, the Court unanimously sustained California’s cartel, rejecting
Arnold’s effort to protect free competition from wealth-reducing state
interference and restore the symbiosis between the Sherman Act and the
dormant Commerce Clause. The Court agreed, for the sake of argument,
that the cartel would violate the Sherman Act if “organized and made
effective solely by virtue of a contract . . . .”425 The Court also “assume[d],” without identifying any counter-argument, that Congress could
preempt California’s cartel “because of its effect on interstate
commerce.”426
Nonetheless, the prorate scheme did not, the Court said, arise from
an agreement between individuals, but instead only came into existence
because of a “legislative command of the state . . . .”427 Given the dual
sovereignty that characterized the American system, the Court would not
lightly impute to Congress the intent to “nullify a state’s control over its
officers and agents.”428 There was, the Court asserted, no evidence that
Congress intended to restrain a state’s agents from activities “directed by
its legislature.”429 While approval by producers was a condition precedent for creation of a prorate arrangement, the state as sovereign determined the terms of the arrangement and enforced it with penal
sanctions.430 There was no indication, the Court claimed, that the Sherman Act, aimed at persons, was designed to interdict this state action.431
The Court then considered whether the state’s interference with free
competition to the detriment of out-of-state consumers contravened the
Commerce Clause. The Court began by applying its traditional
“mechanical test [for] determining when interstate commerce begins with
respect to a commodity grown or manufactured within a state and then
sold and shipped out of it . . . .”432 This test, of course, was akin to the
Court’s pre-1937 efforts to distinguish between “direct” and “indirect”
restraints of interstate commerce, the former of which were beyond the
power of individual states and contrary to the Sherman Act if imposed by
private parties.433 However, two months earlier, the Court had repudi424
425
426

See supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text.
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
Id. (citing four cases, including Illinois Gas v. Public Service Co., 314 U.S. 498, 510

(1943)).
427

Id.
Id.
429 Id. at 350–51.
430 See id. at 352.
431 See id. at 351.
432 Id. at 360.
433 See Meese, Liberty and Antitrust, supra note 50, at 58 (describing the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” restraints in early Supreme Court cases).
428
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ated prior holdings that “indirect” restraints were beyond Congress’s
authority.434
Applying this “mechanical” and otherwise defunct test, the Court
found that California’s cartel was merely an “indirect” regulation of local
activity, because the raisins were packed and processed before shipment.435 The Court did not attempt to square this result with its prior
conclusion that a strike in one steel plant in Pennsylvania would have an
“immediate” and perhaps “catastrophic” effect on interstate commerce,
or that a strike at one clothing factory could directly restrain such commerce and authorize congressional imposition of collective
bargaining.436
Thus, having jettisoned the distinction between manufacturing and
commerce six years earlier and empowering Congress to authorize labor
cartels, the Court revitalized this distinction as a means of sheltering
identical, state-created burdens.437 If anything, the restraint imposed by
California was more severe than that imposed by the respondents in
Jones & Laughlin Steel and its companion cases. California’s scheme,
unless repealed, imposed permanent output reductions and price increases on exports to other states; the state held a virtual monopoly over
raisins.438 By contrast, the burdens on commerce resulting from the unfair labor practices in Jones & Laughlin Steel were purely hypothetical,
and would only result if: (1) a work stoppage occurred and (2) the firm’s
rivals declined to increase output in response.439
Perhaps recognizing the shortcomings of its mechanical test, the
Court offered a different means of analysis.440 Where state regulation of
“matters of local concern” was “so related to interstate commerce that it
434 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) ( “[Activity may] be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce and this irrespective
of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or
‘indirect.’”).
435 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 360–61.
436 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937) (“[S]toppage of
those operations by industrial strife would have a most serious effect upon interstate commerce . . . . [I]t is idle to say that the effect would be indirect or remote. It is obvious that it
would be immediate and might be catastrophic.”); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing
Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75 (1937) (determining that a single clothing factory fell within the NLRB’s
jurisdiction).
437 See generally Parker, 317 U.S. at 362 (stating that a state may impose regulations
affecting interstate commerce “[w]hen Congress has not exerted its power under the Commerce Clause” and “the matter is one which may appropriately be regulated in the interest of
the safety, health and well-being of local communities . . . .”).
438 See id. at 345, 359 (describing California’s market dominance and the prorate program); Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Preemption Doctrine and its Limits, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION 309, 321 (Richard Epstein & Michael Greve eds., 2007) (explaining that the
pro-rate scheme was intended “to tax the nation for California’s benefit”).
439 See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 41.
440 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 362 (“But courts are not confined to so mechanical a test.”).
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also operate[d] as a regulation of that commerce,” and Congress had not
exercised its commerce power (given the Court’s Sherman Act holding),
the Court sought to “reconcil[e]” congressional and state power.441 Such
“reconciliation,” the Court said, required “the accommodation of the
competing demands of the state and national interests involved.”442 The
inquiry was not, the Court said, whether the restraint in question was
“direct” (as it assuredly was).443 Instead the question was whether “the
matter is one [that] may appropriately be regulated in the interest of the
safety, health and well-being of local communities, and which, because
of its local character and the practical difficulties involved, may never be
adequately dealt with by Congress.”444 Because of the activity’s “local
character,” the Court said, there was a “wide scope for local regulation
without substantially impairing the national interest in the regulation of
commerce by a single authority and without materially obstructing the
free flow of commerce.”445 The Court did not explain why the impact of
California’s cartel on interstate commerce was not “material.”446 Nor
did the Court mention more relevant decisions invalidating state efforts
to fix the price of interstate commerce, including its 1927 holding that
the State of Rhode Island could not regulate the price of electric current
that a Rhode Island corporation sold to a corporation in
Massachusetts.447
Applying this more malleable standard, the Court determined that
California’s cartel did not offend the Commerce Clause, even though
95% of its production was sold in interstate commerce.448 Without citing
Nebbia or Appalachian Coals, the Court embraced California’s argument
(which had invoked these decisions) that state-enforced cartelization was
necessary to counteract the “evils attending the production and marketing
of raisins in that state,” which “urgently demand[ed] state action for the
economic protection of those engaged in one of [the state’s] important
441 Id. Indeed, as explained earlier, the Court (properly) assumed for the sake of argument that a similar private restraint would violate the Sherman Act. See Meese, Liberty and
Antitrust, supra note 50, at 55 (discussing distinction in formative era case law between direct
and indirect restraints).
442 Parker, 317 U.S. at 362.
443 Id.
444 Id. at 362–63.
445 Id. at 363 (citing California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 113 (1941) and Simpson v.
Shepard, 230 U.S. 352, 406 (1913)). Neither decision cited was particularly apposite. Simpson involved the regulation of rates for intrastate travel. See Simpson, 230 U.S. at 376–77.
Thompson involved the licensure of transportation agents whose participation in interstate
commerce was incidental to their primary intrastate business. See Thompson, 313 U.S. at 111.
446 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 363.
447 See, e.g., Pub. Util. Comm’n of R. I. v. Attleboro Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 84–85, 90
(1927).
448 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 359, 368.
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industries.”449 The Court reported that raisin prices had peaked in 1921
at $235 per ton, inducing increased production, thereby depressing
prices, which had ranged between $40 and $60 per ton since that time.450
Since 1934, prices had fallen so low that “students of the industry” believed that prices were below production costs.451 Indeed, since 1929,
the industry had continuously sought to “stabilize . . . the raisin crop and
maintain a price standard which would bring about a fair return to the
producers,”452 the same sort of collective action that Justice Brandeis had
endorsed in his New State Ice dissent.453 California’s prorate program
had in fact helped stabilize production, reducing interstate shipments and
increasing prices “to some undetermined extent.”454 In so doing, the
Court said, California had simply mimicked federal policy, expressed in
the 1937 Agricultural Marketing Act, to “in one way or another, . . .
prevent over-production of agricultural products and excessive competition in marketing them, with price stabilization as the ultimate objective.”455 Thus, invoking reasoning unthinkable before Nebbia, the Court
sustained California’s coercive interference with free-market competition
because both the state and the federal government had embraced agricultural cartelization. This holding, it should be noted, did more than empower states to impose cartels: it also authorized direct state antitrust
regulation of interstate commerce—authority once held solely by Congress—resulting in what one commentator rightly called a “very broad”
overlap of state and federal antitrust authority.456
Parker’s reasoning is both ironic and questionable. As already
noted, the Court did not explain why California’s cartelization of the
nation’s entire raisin output, nearly all of which was consumed outside
the state, had a “local” and “immaterial” effect on interstate commerce,
while a temporary shutdown of a single steel or clothing factory produced an “immediate” and perhaps “catastrophic” effect within congres449 Id. at 363; see also John T. Delacourt & Todd Zywicki, The FTC and State Action:
Evolving Views on the Proper Role of Government, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1075, 1077 (2005)
(contending that Parker depended upon a “mindset . . . extremely skeptical of markets, favoring instead government industrial policy”).
450 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 363–64.
451 Id. at 364.
452 Id.
453 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 292–93 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing the dangers of competition and the ice industry’s tendency to discourage
competition).
454 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 367.
455 See id. at 367–68. See also Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, Pub. L.
No. 75-137, 50 Stat. 246 (1937); supra 375 and accompanying text (discussing post-Schechter
legislation authorizing agricultural marketing orders limiting production).
456 See JOHN J. FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE ANTITRUST REGULATION 214 (1964); see
also Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375, 401–02
(1982) (addressing the relationship between state and federal antitrust law).
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sional jurisdiction.457 Moreover, the Court’s finding that California’s de
facto export cartel did not thwart national policy followed from its holding that the Sherman Act does not preempt such regulation.458 That conclusion, in turn, involved a reconstruction of the subjective intent of the
Congress that passed the Act.459 The Court did not recognize that the
1890 Congress would have assumed that state-initiated cartels that directly restrained interstate commerce were independently unconstitutional because they offended either or both the Commerce and Due
Process Clauses.460 It thus would have made little sense for Congress to
outlaw conduct that was already unconstitutional.461 By eviscerating economic liberty in previous decisions and rejecting the petitioner’s Commerce Clause challenge, the Court undermined the very protection from
state restraints on competition that may have deterred the Sherman Act’s
drafters from expressly preempting such restrictions. During the same
period, of course, the Court was expanding the application of the Sherman Act to private parties in unprecedented ways, equating free competition with atomistic markets.462
*****
Before the Depression, a unified and mutually reinforcing framework had protected free-market competition from state, federal, and private threats. In Appalachian Coals, however, the Supreme Court
blinked, approving private restraints on free competition in the name of
economic stabilization.463 A year later, in Nebbia, the same Court approved state-imposed price fixing, ignoring well-settled precedent to the
contrary.464
While Congress and the President sought to thwart free competition
via the NIRA and its partial repeal of the antitrust laws, the Supreme
Court struck back and restored the Sherman Act as the law of the land.
Within five years of Schechter, the Court had implicitly repudiated Ap457 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937); see also NLRB v.
Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75 (1937) (relying upon Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. to hold that Congress has authority to impose collective bargaining upon a single
clothing factory with a trivial share of the nation’s clothing production).
458 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350–51 (“We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act
or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents
from activities directed by its legislature.”).
459 See id. (interpreting the legislative history of the Sherman Act).
460 See Meese, Liberty and Antitrust, supra note 50, at 32–33, 61, 66 (discussing decisions invalidating state interference with contractual liberty, including state price fixing, and
describing case law prohibiting state impositions of “direct restraints” on interstate commerce).
See also supra notes 58–63, 104–22 and accompanying text.
461 See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 725 (2d ed. 1999).
462 See Meese, Price Theory, Competition, supra note 80, at 133–34.
463 See Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 377 (1933).
464 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
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palachian Coals and restored free competition as antitrust’s central principle, perhaps paving the way for restoration of free competition as the
guiding principle for all regulation. However, instead of treating antitrust as a role model and restoring the pre-Depression symbiosis between
various doctrines protecting free competition, the Court took a radically
different course, reaffirming Nebbia’s repudiation of economic liberty
and free competition and rejecting pre-Depression precedents that had
banned state-imposed wage and price fixing under the Due Process
Clauses and dormant Commerce Clause.465 As a result, the pre-Depression symbiosis between the Sherman Act, dormant Commerce Clause,
and Due Process Clause was a thing of the past. Free-market competition and the beneficial results it produced existed only at the sufferance
of the national and state governments, which were all too eager to reduce
or eliminate competition altogether.
VIII. CARTELIZATION

AS

(POOR) STABILIZATION POLICY

Proponents of the NIRA, the NLRA, and some other abridgments of
free competition and economic liberty believed that such measures
would counteract the Depression by sparking economic recovery. Indeed, Congress and FDR designed both the NIRA and the NLRA to increase the “purchasing power” of workers by raising wages relative to
prices, and the United States invoked this rationale when defending the
NIRA in Schechter.466 In the same way, the first Agricultural Adjustment Act sought to restore the purchasing power of farmers by reducing
agricultural output and raising crop and livestock prices.467 States, too,
relied on the supposed propensity of coercive interference with free competition to increase purchasing power.468 Nearly five decades after the
NIRA, leading economists would claim that Americans have the “political activists of the Roosevelt administration,” who purportedly reversed
Herbert Hoover’s policies, to thank for recovery from the Depression.469
This belief—that interference with free competition helped spark
economic recovery—has even left its mark on constitutional law. Indeed, in 1992, three Supreme Court Justices claimed that economic
events of the 1930s had compelled the Supreme Court to overrule decisions protecting economic liberty from undue interference. The occasion
for this pronouncement was Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a decision
465 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (upholding minimum wage legislation).
466 See Brief for the United States in Schechter Poultry, supra note 319, at 114–15.
467 See HAWLEY, supra note 166, at 192.
468 See, e.g., Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587, 615 n.2 (1936) (reproducing legislative findings that minimum wages would enhance purchasing power).
469 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
170 (2d ed. 1982).
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about abortion regulation, thereby illustrating subtle linkages between
supposedly unrelated doctrines.470 In Casey, the Court reconsidered its
controversial holding in Roe v. Wade that the “liberty” referenced in the
Due Process Clause includes the right to abort a fetus and that protection
of fetal life is not a “compelling state interest” to justify prohibiting abortion before the third trimester.471
The controlling opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
declined to opine on Roe’s correctness, instead relying upon stare decisis
to reaffirm Roe’s “essential holding.”472 The joint opinion’s invocation
of stare decisis drew immediate criticism, given that the Court had previously overruled decisions that had stood longer than Roe.473 One example, of course, was Allgeyer v. Louisiana,474 which presaged Lochner v.
New York.475 Decided unanimously in 1897, Allgeyer was applied and
reaffirmed, sometimes unanimously, over three decades, and then implicitly questioned in Nebbia and abandoned in West Coast Hotel Co.476
The joint opinion argued that, even if Allgeyer and Lochner were
correct, subsequent real world events, external to both the Court and the
applicable legal doctrine, undermined the factual premises supporting
these decisions, thereby compelling the Court to overrule them.477 As
the joint opinion put it:
The Lochner decisions were exemplified by Adkins v.
Children’s Hospital of District of Columbia . . . in which
the Court held it to be an infringement of constitutionally protected liberty of contract to require employers of
adult women to satisfy minimum wage standards. Fourteen years later, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, . . .
signaled the demise of Lochner by overruling Adkins. In
the meantime the Depression had come and, with it, the
lesson that seemed unmistakable to most people by
1937, that the interpretation of contractual freedom protected in Adkins rested on fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated
470

See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861–62 (1992).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 163, 164–65 (1973).
472 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (summarizing this holding).
473 See id. at 957 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (leveling this critique).
474 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
475 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
476 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (upholding minimum
wage legislation); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (upholding price fixing);
Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Kansas, 262 U.S. 522, 544 (1923) (unanimous) (invalidating
wage regulation of private industry as contrary to freedom of contract). Roe, by contrast, had
never been reaffirmed unanimously. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 835 (discussing the subsequent
history of Roe).
477 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 836.
471
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market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare. . . .
[T]he clear demonstration that the facts of economic life
were different from those previously assumed warranted
the repudiation of the old law.478
These Justices echoed scholars who had previously concluded that protection for economic liberty and free-market determinations of wages
and prices had prevented economic recovery before the Court reversed
course and allowed Congress and the states to supplant free competition
with state-imposed cartels.479 Nearly a decade after Casey, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer and Ginsburg, reiterated his belief
that “laissez-faire” was not able to “govern the national economy 70
years ago,” and that this reality necessitated expansion of Congress’s
commerce power.480
Theory and evidence suggest that there is no conflict between maintaining free competition, with its wealth-creating advantages on the one
hand, and macroeconomic stabilization on the other. Instead, protection
for economic liberty can help prevent downturns and facilitate recovery.481 Take theory first. Proponents of the NIRA and similar measures
believed that low prices and wages “caused” the Depression by depriving
consumers, farmers and small businesspeople of the “purchasing power”
necessary to buy up the output of capital-intensive industries.482 By stabilizing wages and prices, it was said, these measures could restore the
478

See id. at 861–62.
See, e.g., Wayne McCormack, Property and Liberty—Institutional Competence and
the Functions of Rights, 51 WASH. &. LEE L. REV. 1, 10 (1994) (“The protections thus developed [during the Allgeyer/Lochner era] withered when the Great Depression showed that unregulated industrialization represented risks too great to be borne by a sensible society.”);
ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 125–37 (1941) (arguing that
the Supreme Court thwarted economic recovery when it voided the Agricultural Adjustment
Act); Edwin S. Corwin, Social Planning Under the Constitution—A Study in Perspectives, 26
AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 26–27 (1932); cf. Nancy Staudt & Yilei He, The Macroeconomic
Court: Rhetoric and Implications of New Deal Decision-Making, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 87,
112 (2010) (contending that the Court moderated its protection for economic liberty when
recovery from the Depression stalled).
Indeed, Laurence Tribe has argued as follows:
In large measure, however, it was the economic realities of the Depression that
graphically undermined Lochner’s premises. No longer could it be argued with
great conviction that the invisible hand of economics was functioning simultaneously to protect individual rights and produce a social optimum . . . . Positive government intervention came to be more widely accepted as essential to economic
survival, and legal doctrines would henceforth have to operate from that premise.
LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 578 (1999).
480 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 655 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
481 See Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgment and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter and the
(Mis)Translation of the Due Process Clause, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 3, 46–50 (1999) [hereinafter Meese, Will, Judgment and Economic Liberty] (critiquing this argument, propounded
by Justice Souter and others).
482 See supra Part IV.
479
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masses’ purchasing power, stimulate demand, and counteract the Depression.483 Indeed, Herbert Hoover had himself cajoled business into maintaining nominal wages and thus “consuming power.”484 The NIRA and
similar state and federal measures merely gave legal sanction to Hoover’s policy of wage and price stabilization.485
Modern economists would reject this logic, pointing out, as John
Maynard Keynes did in a 1933 letter to FDR, that depressions cause low
wages and prices, not the other way around, that falling wages and prices
can facilitate recovery, and that propping up wages and prices will exacerbate a downturn.486 To be precise, an unanticipated shock, e.g., a sudden tax increase, can reduce consumption and investment and thus
reduce aggregate demand.487 Absent legal or de facto wage and price
controls, nominal wages and prices will fall. For any given nominal
money supply, the reduced price level will increase the real value of the
money that individuals hold, thereby reducing real interest rates, spurring
consumption and investment, and enhancing aggregate demand.488 Absent an additional shock, overall output will rise back to the pre-contraction level.489
In the real world, however, wages and prices are sometimes inflexible. If, after a fall in aggregate demand, prices remain fixed or, worse,
rise, no self-correction will occur and the economy will remain “stuck”
483 See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 90–91, A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (Nos. 854, 864) (contending that NIRA’s price and wagefixing provisions would increase purchasing power and consumption); Morehead v. New
York, 298 U.S. 587, 615 (1936) (reproducing New York’s legislative findings that minimum
wage would enhance purchasing power and thus consumption). See also supra notes 466–69
and accompanying text (reproducing arguments that NLRA and Agricultural Adjustment Act
would enhance purchasing power and thus consumption).
484 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
485 See discussion supra Part IV.
486 See Open Letter of John Maynard Keynes to President Roosevelt (Dec. 16, 1933)
(“[T]oo much emphasis on the remedial value of a higher price[ ] level as an object in itself
may lead to serious misapprehension as to the part which prices can play in the technique of
recovery. The stimulation of output by increasing aggregate purchasing power [i.e., aggregate
demand] is the right way to get prices up[,] not the other way [a]round.”). Keynes, of course,
employed “purchasing power” as a synonym of “aggregate demand,” and believed that government could increase such demand via deficit spending. See also Meese, Will, Judgment
and Economic Liberty, supra note 481, at 48–49 (explaining how the NIRA’s wage and price
fixing likely exacerbated the Depression and slowed economic recovery).
487 See Meese, Section 2 and the Great Recession, supra note 20, at 1661 n.172 (citing
MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, supra note 140, at 328).
488 See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 308–09
(1970) (describing this chain of events); Pigou, supra note 169, at 351 (“[I]f wage earners
follow a competitive wage policy, the economic system must move ultimately to a full-employment stationary state . . . .”); Christina D. Romer, The Nation in Depression, 7 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, 19, 25 (1993) (“In the conventional textbook model a fall in wages and prices
raises real balances, lowers interest rates, and thus stimulates investment. The rise in investment serves to counteract at least some of the fall in demand.”).
489 See Pigou, supra note 169, at 349–50.
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below full employment.490 Indeed, even if prices fall, inflexible wages
can prevent recovery.491 According to Keynes’s famous dictum, recessions persist because nominal “wages are sticky [downwards],” such that
real wages rise when the economy contracts and prices fall.492 Inflated
real wages will increase production costs, thereby reducing output at any
given price level.493 Labor markets will remain in semi-permanent disequilibrium as the quantity of labor supplied at pre-contraction wages exceeds the labor demanded, thereby creating unemployment.494
Rudimentary macroeconomic theory thus predicts that the NIRA
and similar policies exacerbated and prolonged this disequilibrium by
adding legal sanction to the natural propensity of firms and employees to
resist price and wage reductions, thereby thwarting the normal economic
adjustment process described above.495 Keynes had said as much, observing that the NIRA “probably impede[d] recovery.”496 For decades
other economists observed that recovery from the Depression was significantly slower and less robust than the average recovery before or
since.497 Some even speculated that the NIRA and similar measures had
490 MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS, supra note 165, at 274–75; F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 363 (2d ed. 1980).
491 See HENRY SIMONS, A Positive Program for Laissez Faire: Some Proposals for a
Liberal Economic Policy, 53 (1934), reprinted in ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY,
40–77 (1948) (“Decisively important in the [cycle of recession] is the exceeding inflexibility
of wages . . . .”).
492 See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY 232, 237 (1936) (referring to wages as being “sticky in terms of money”); id. at 7–13
(detailing how real wage often rises in a downturn); Pigou, supra note 169, at 344 (“[S]hould
wage-earners . . . contrive, by means of combination or otherwise, to set the real rate of wages
‘too high,’ the stationary state would not be one of full employment.”).
493 See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 469, at 169–70 (explaining how “sticky” wages
can prevent self-correction from an economic downturn).
494 See WENDY CARLIN & DAVID SOSKICE, MACROECONOMICS AND THE WAGE BARGAIN:
A MODERN APPROACH TO EMPLOYMENT, INFLATION, AND THE EXCHANGE RATE 49 (1990)
(“[In] Keynes’s model . . . the failure of money wages to fall . . . led, in the context of a fall in
autonomous demand, to the real wage rising and the consequent fall in employment and
output . . . .”).
495 See STEIN, supra note 159, at 149 (noting that Keynes believed the NIRA impeded
recovery); see also John D. Harkrider, supra note 342, at 23 (“[C]artelization is unlikely to lift
the nation out of economic stagnation . . . .”); Meese, Will, Judgment and Economic Liberty,
supra note 481, at 48–49 (“Before the NIRA and other schemes to set minimum wages, prices
and wages were sticky; afterwards, they were stuck. Liberty of contract and full employment
are not mutually exclusive.”); Meese, Section 2 and the Great Recession, supra note 20, at
1662–66.
496 See Open Letter from John Maynard Keynes to President Roosevelt (Dec. 16, 1933)
(“[M]y first reflection [is] that the N.I.R.A., which is essentially Reform and probably impedes
Recovery, has been put across too hastily, in the false guise of being part of the technique of
Recovery.”).
497 See Cole & Ohanian, supra note 383, at 779–81 (detailing weak recovery from the
Depression); Robert Lucas & Leonard A. Rapping, Unemployment in the Great Depression: Is
There a Full Explanation?, 80 J. POL. ECON. 186, 191 (1972).
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slowed recovery,498 while others argued that poor fiscal and monetary
policies helped turn the 1929 downturn into a Depression.499
Such speculation and Keynes’s prediction were spot on. More recently, economists have directly measured the impact of the NIRA, particularly its wage-enhancing provisions, on recovery.500 These scholars
have found that wages and prices in industries governed by NIRA codes
were higher than they otherwise would have been and also higher than in
industries without such codes.501 Moreover, after Schechter, the NLRA
preserved the NIRA’s policy of labor cartelization, further boosting
wages.502 Thus, scholars have also found that such increased wages reduced output and employment in sectors governed by the NLRA, while
increasing employment (and reducing wages) in competitive sectors.503
As a result, idle resources in cartelized sectors, including labor, flowed
after some friction and delay into less valuable uses in non-cartelized
sectors, thus depressing wages in those sectors relative to wages in
cartelized sectors.504 On balance, the misallocation of resources caused
498 See Lucas & Rapping, supra note 497, at 186 n.4 (finding that “traditional theory”
could not explain the jump in wages and prices that occurred in 1934 despite 25% unemployment); see also ARMEN ALCHIAN, Information Costs, Pricing and Resource Unemployment
(1969), in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ARMEN A. ALCHIAN 53, 76–77 (2006) (suggesting
that the NIRA, minimum wage measures and similar regulations were “autonomous factors
pushing up permissible (though not the equilibrating) prices” without which “1933–37 would
have shown greater employment”); FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 156, at 498–99; KENNETH D. ROOSE, THE ECONOMICS OF RECESSION AND REVIVAL 45–57 (1954) (making a similar
argument).
499 See, e.g., MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS, supra note 165, at 331–32.
500 See Cole & Ohanian, supra note 383 passim.
501 Id. at 787–93, 811–12 (finding that the NIRA and similar policies raised wages and
prices in covered sectors relative to wages and prices elsewhere); Christina D. Romer, Why
Did Prices Rise in the 1930s?, 59 J. ECON. HIST. 167, 197 (1999) (“The more important effect
of the NIRA was to diminish the responsiveness of price changes to the deviation of output
from trend. By preventing the large negative deviations of output from trend in the mid-1930s
from exerting deflationary pressure, it prevented the economy’s self-correction mechanism
from working. Thus, the NIRA can be best thought of as a force holding back recovery, rather
than as one actively depressing output.”); cf. Lucas & Rapping, supra note 497, at 191 (wages
increased in 1933–34 by 11% despite 25% unemployment).
502 See Cole & Ohanian, supra note 383, at 785–86.
503 Id. at 810–12.
504 See SCHERER, supra note 488, at 309–10 (explaining that such a transfer of resources
from one sector to another entails costly frictions and temporary unemployment, during which
unutilized workers produce nothing). See also Harkrider, supra note 342, at 9 (“Allowing
competitors to restrict output and increase price above a competitive level may allow these
firms to pay higher wages to their workers, but it does so at a significant cost, by restricting
output at a time when the economy needs to expand.”); Henry Simons, Economic Stability and
Antitrust Policy, 11 U. CHI. L. REV. 338, 343 (1943) (“During depressions, the stabilization of
particular prices against a general decline serves to shift the burdens of depression heavily
upon other groups and, thus, to increase the difficulties of effective monetary and fiscal counteraction. Sustaining such prices means larger curtailment of employment and, thus, of spending. It means drawing off a larger share of spending to the particular enterprises, and thus,
deepening the depression in other areas of the economy.”).

R
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by the NIRA and NLRA resulted in reduced output overall.505 Absent
the NIRA and similar measures, then, the Depression would have ended
significantly sooner than it actually did. Indeed, two scholars have concluded that by artificially inflating wages, the NIRA and the NLRA,
taken together, lengthened the Depression by several years.506 These
findings likely understate the impact of the NIRA, given the various
other ways in which the “codes of fair competition” interfered with free
competition, distorted the allocation of resources, and reduced the value
of national output.507 Simply put, adherence to the pre-Depression constitutional doctrines that protected free-market competition from coercive
interference would have spurred recovery and thus enhanced the nation’s
economic welfare.
IX. LESSONS LEARNED

AND A

NEW WAY FORWARD

The (de)evolution of various doctrines that once protected free competition from undue private, state, and national restraints and the negative
macroeconomic impact of resulting interference with free competition
hold many lessons for a body politic considering the appropriate scope of
state and national regulation. This experience can also inform efforts to
avoid or ameliorate future recessions and maximize society’s potential
output. This concluding section sketches some of these lessons and offers suggestions for how to restore free competition as the presumptive
economic norm in sectors currently characterized by state interference
with free-market pricing and output.
First, macroeconomic stability and free competition reinforce one
another. On the one hand, severe macroeconomic fluctuations can result
in poor competition policy, indeed, coercive displacement of competition
altogether. Imagine, for instance, if there had been no Depression. Hoover, who opposed the Swope Plan and other amendments to the antitrust
laws, may have won reelection in 1932. The history of competition policy—both statutory and constitutional—may have been much different.
There may have been no Appalachian Coals decision and no NIRA.
State efforts to displace competition by, for instance, creating raisin or
505 See Cole & Ohanian, supra note 383, at 804–13 (contending that artificial gap between wages in competitive and cartelized sectors reduced employment in cartelized sectors
and caused individuals in competitive sectors to forgo work and search for employment in
high-wage cartelized sector).
506 See Cole & Ohanian, supra note 383, at 808–09 (finding that 1936 GDP was 25%
below predicted level); id. at 781 (attributing most of the negative deviation from trend to
wage and price rigidity caused by the NIRA and NLRA); id. at 782 (showing output well
below trend even in 1939); Harold L. Cole & Lee E. Ohanian, How Government Prolonged the
Depression, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2009, 12:01AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB123353276749137485 (“Our research indicates that New Deal labor and industrial policies
prolonged the Depression by seven years.”).
507 See discussion supra Part IV.
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dairy cartels, may not have emerged in the first place. Even if such cartels had arisen, they may have fallen prey to either or both liberty of
contract and dormant Commerce Clause challenges in a Court that was
more confident that economy-wide free competition would maximize the
nation’s welfare.508 America may have avoided post-Schechter industryspecific limitations on competition such as the Motor Carrier Act, Robinson-Patman Act, minimum wages, and the NLRA. Sound fiscal and
monetary policy, it seems, can do more than ensure full employment,
stable prices and economic growth. These first order consequences can
have second order effects, namely, dampening the political demand for
coercive displacement of free-market competition.
On the other hand, free competition and the resulting flexibility of
wages and prices promote macroeconomic stability. Stabilization policy,
whether by fiscal or monetary stimulus, does not work instantly. Measures that reduce wage and price flexibility interfere with the normal process of macroeconomic adjustment and slow recovery.509 If history is
any guide, free competition did not cause the 2008 downturn and displacing free competition will only slow recovery. Modern policy makers
would do well to avoid the New Deal’s mistakes and resist recent calls to
displace free competition even further by raising the minimum wage and
encouraging the formation of unions, for instance.510
Given the correlation between free competition and macroeconomic
stability, it is more than a little ironic that the national government’s
failure to counteract the Depression, a downturn exacerbated by Hoover’s tax increases and FDR’s NIRA, created a political environment
conducive to other measures that slowed the economic recovery in the
short run and reduced output in numerous industries in the longer run.
These conclusions reinforce the importance of getting macroeconomic
stabilization policy right.
Second, in a society characterized by private property, free contract
and federalism, various regulatory regimes will govern the extent to
which free competition allocates resources and determines prices, output,
and society’s economic welfare. At the same time, nominally distinct
doctrines, such as liberty of contract and the application (or not) of the
Sherman Act to state-enforced cartels, are not hermetically sealed from
one another; developments in one area of the law can influence other
seemingly disparate doctrines. Appalachian Coals and the FTC’s “codes
508 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861–62 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (contending that the Depression convinced the Court that protection for economic
liberty reduced nation’s economic welfare); Staudt & He, supra note 479, passim.
509 See supra notes 481–86 and accompanying text (collecting theory and evidence to this
effect).
510 See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text (detailing recent calls to increase minimum wages).
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of fair competition” set in motion a cascade of departures from free competition, culminating in the Parker Court’s unanimous validation of California’s raisin export cartel, a result unthinkable under pre-Depression
precedent.511
Rationales for rejecting free markets in one context, whether statutory or constitutional, cannot be confined to a particular doctrinal pigeonhole. Anti-market advocates will deploy such rationales elsewhere,
seeking to influence other doctrines and spread the anti-market contagion. The Roosevelt Administration learned this the hard way in Parker
v Brown, having invoked Nebbia and Appalachian Coals to justify the
NIRA only to see the rationales of these decisions deployed less than a
decade later in Parker to justify state-enforced cartelization of an industry exporting the vast majority of its products to other states.512 If protecting producers justifies abridging the right to sell healthy food to
destitute citizens, why not allow a state to limit the supply of raisins sold
in interstate commerce? Those who advocate departure from free markets in one context should not be surprised when the resulting rationale
comes back to haunt them in a different setting.
Third, poor competition policy, of whatever source, can have a long
half-life and is not easily undone, even when economic science discredits
the rationale for displacing free-market outcomes. “Experimental” departures from free competition during “emergencies” predictably create
vested interests in maintaining the new status quo and cartel profits. We
lived with the worst aspects of the Motor Carrier and Civil Aeronautics
Acts for over four decades.513 The Miller-Tydings Act authorizing “fair
trade laws” stood thirty-eight years, and the Robinson-Patman Act is still
with us, tamed somewhat by the Supreme Court.514 The “labor exemption” from the antitrust laws, the NLRA, and some of the unions both
spawned survive to this day, albeit defanged somewhat by the 1947 TaftHartley Act, “right to work” states, deregulation and international trade,
all of which constrain union market power.515 There is a still a federal
511

Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 363, 368 (1943).
See supra notes 403–21 and accompanying text (detailing the federal government’s
unsuccessful argument that California’s raisin cartel violated the Sherman Act and dormant
Commerce Clause).
513 See Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980) (deregulating
the trucking industry); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(1978) (deregulating the airline industry).
514 See, e.g., Brooke Group v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Co., 509 U.S. 209 (1993)
(increasing burden on plaintiffs seeking to establish that price discrimination substantially reduced competition and thus violates the Robinson-Patman Act).
515 See supra note 86 and accompanying text (describing labor exemption from the antitrust laws). See also Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947 Pub. L. No. 80101, 61 Stat. 136, 140–43 (1947); Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 613–23 (2007) (explaining how various
forms of deregulation and changes in corporate law have reduced labor cartels’ power).
512
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“minimum wage,” and numerous states impose even higher wages
still.516 Various federal “marketing orders” increase the price of milk
and other agricultural commodities.517 Other exemptions protect industries such as insurance, international ocean shipping, higher education,
and baseball.518
Parker has also survived, even thrived; if anything, the doctrine is
more anticompetitive than ever. Parker’s dormant Commerce Clause
holding portrayed agriculture as a local activity;519 the Court also invoked national legislation discouraging raisin production.520 Under
Parker’s progeny, however, states may authorize cartels regardless of
whether Congress has pursued a similar output-reducing policy.521
Moreover, even municipalities may displace competition, despite the
Sherman Act, with only implicit state legislative sanction.522 All despite
the antitrust community’s long-standing rejection of claims that “ruinous
competition” justifies the imposition of price and output restraints by
parties with an economic interest in the outcome.523
Moreover, Parker-like reasoning, whereby “federalism” purportedly
justifies one state’s override of national competition policy, does more
than justify immunity for either or both state-imposed cartels and monopolies that injure consumers in forty-nine other states. Such invocations
of federalism also encourage states to ban, under their own antitrust laws,
practices that enhance economic welfare and are thus perfectly reasonable and lawful under the Sherman Act.524 Federalism is also said to justify state imposition of remedies that national policy deems excessive
and counter-productive.525
As noted earlier, however, such concurrent jurisdiction over purported restraints of interstate commerce contravenes the intent of the
516

See Ellis, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See Chris Edwards, Milk Madness, CATO INST. TAX & BUDGET BULL., July 2007,
available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tbb_0707_47.pdf.
518 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 378
(2007) (collecting these and other antitrust exemptions).
519 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 363 (1943).
520 See id. at 368.
521 See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 377, at 736–42. See also
Consumer Goods Pricing Act, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
522 See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365, 370–72 (1991).
523 See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695–96 (1978);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210–18 (1940).
524 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Cf. Leegin v. PSKS, 551 U.S. 877, 886–87
(2007) (collecting decisions banning minimum RPM under state law).
525 See Cal. v. ARC Am. Co., 490 U.S. 93, 93–94 (1989) (holding that states may empower indirect purchasers to obtain treble damages for violations of their own antitrust laws
even though such remedies are not available under Federal law due to possibility of duplicative
recoveries); Jean Wegman Burns, Embracing Both Faces of Antitrust Federalism: Parker and
ARC America Corp., 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 29, 29 (2000).
517
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Congress that passed the Sherman Act, which assumed that jurisdiction
over restraints governed by antitrust law was mutually exclusive between
states and the national government.526 As others have argued, states that
second-guess regulatory choices that federal courts and enforcement
agencies make when implementing federal antitrust laws often lack the
expertise and incentives necessary to generate welfare-enhancing
rules.527 Moreover, to the extent that states ban efficient conduct that is
lawful under the Sherman Act, even to foster additional (atomistic)
“competition,” the negative impact on economic welfare is indistinguishable from that caused by state orchestration of a cartel.528 Preventing
conduct that improves the allocation of resources is as harmful as allowing conduct that distorts such allocation.
The debate over health care reform illustrates the continuing influence on public policy and national welfare of anticompetitive New Deal
legislation implementing an extreme version of federalism. As explained
earlier, President Obama and his congressional allies advocated creation
of a “public option” health insurance plan, owned by the national government, to inject “competition” into health insurance markets.529 Why,
though, are such markets concentrated, and prices for health insurance so
high, in the first place? One obvious reason is the 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act, which exempts such companies from nearly all federal antitrust regulation, so long as there is minimal state oversight of the
industry.530 Given this exemption, firms can jointly propose rates, subject only to negation by a state agency that may instead “rubber stamp”
collusive proposals.531 Moreover, the McCarran-Ferguson Act goes
even further, allowing states to protect their domestic insurance companies by prohibiting entry by out-of-state firms.532
526

See supra notes 393–94 and accompanying text.
See Michael S. Greve, Cartel Federalism? Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys
General, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (2005); Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of
Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST
JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 252, 261–62 (Richard A. Epstein and Michael S.
Greve, eds., 2004) (contending that states should not apply their own antitrust laws to conduct
that occurs in or affects interstate commerce).
528 For instance, banning efficient non-standard contracts to increase “competition” will
reduce economic welfare by inducing a less efficient allocation of scarce resources. See Oliver
E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 988–89 (1979) [hereinafter Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions] (explaining how non-standard agreements that reduce
transaction costs facilitate efficient allocation of resources).
529 See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
530 See supra notes 27, 377 and accompanying text (explaining contours of the McCarranFerguson Act).
531 HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 377, at 732 (reporting that the
McCarran-Ferguson exemption applies even if the state agency merely “rubber stamps” regulated entities’ requests).
532 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
527
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Of course, Congress rejected the Public Option.533 Congress also
rejected calls to repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act and thus subject insurance to free-market discipline.534 Finally, Congress declined to preempt “certificate of need laws,” analogous to those invalidated in New
State Ice, which prevent hospitals from entering concentrated markets
without administrative approval.535 It is no surprise, then, that most markets for health care and health insurance are highly concentrated.536 As a
result, consumers must fend for themselves in state-by-state markets
rigged to promote concentration among health care providers and both
concentration and collusion among health insurance firms. One can only
guess what the modern health insurance market would look like if the
Sherman Act governed the industry. The NIRA’s dead hand, channeled
via the McCarran-Ferguson Act and certificate of need laws, still influences our economic welfare. The longevity and genesis of such schemes
actually gives rise to a presumption against them.
Fourth, antitrust law is not the only potential source of competition
policy, and even the very best antitrust law, administered by expert and
well-incentivized officials, cannot ensure optimal competition policy society-wide. As a statutory regime, antitrust law is subject to change at
the whim of Congress, which can replace antitrust principles with regulatory diktat or exempt particular industries from federal oversight. The
McCarran-Ferguson Act does exactly that, of course. Moreover, given
Parker and its progeny, state legislatures and city councils can replace
competition with cartelization, even when the near-exclusive effect of
such collusion falls on out-of-state consumers. Under our current antitrust regime, then, a few doctors cannot, for anticompetitive reasons, vote
to exclude a single physician from a single hospital in Los Angeles.537
However, California can create a raisin cartel, set resale prices of liquor
manufactured out-of-state, or prevent new hospitals from entering the
Los Angeles market by requiring them to obtain “certificates of need”
that may be denied.538
Thus, a society interested in ensuring that free markets allocate its
resources and direct its growth must do more than simply pass and enforce a well-crafted antitrust statute. It must also prevent other legal regimes from intruding on the workings of the very sort of free markets
533

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119

(2010).
534 See Competitive Health Insurance Reform Act of 2011, H.R. 1150, 112th Cong.
(2011) (proposed legislation to end McCarran-Ferguson antitrust immunity).
535 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing such laws).
536 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (collecting evidence on such concentration).
537 See Summit Health, Ltd., v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 332–33 (1991).
538 See generally 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344 (1987) (condemning such
state price-fixing, because state did not actively supervise the prices).
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antitrust is designed to encourage. Such protection for free competition
can take many forms. While meaningful protection for liberty of contract may be a thing of the past, a political culture that values economic
liberty and free-market resource allocation can raise the cost of enacting
anticompetitive legislation, and antitrust scholars and lawyers can help
shape that culture. Moreover, playing this role requires more than simply advocating application of pro-competitive rules of conduct within the
current scope of antitrust doctrine. Scholars and lawyers must also advocate just as vigorously—perhaps more so—for expanding the domain of
antitrust, eliminating exemptions and immunities that can reduce economic welfare far more than a facet of antitrust doctrine that departs only
somewhat from the optimum.539 This same constituency can follow the
lead of anti-competition advocates during the 1930s, exporting principles
and assumptions from the antitrust context—but this time principles that
favor markets—to other doctrinal contexts such as the dormant Commerce Clause. In this connection, scholars and other advocates should
consider whether the intellectual energy spent making arguments
“around the edges” about the exact scope of a particular immunity might
be better employed generating arguments against either or both the existence and continued validity of such exemptions in the first place. If
anything, lawyerly arguments about the exact scope and qualities of a
particular exemption can buttress the legitimacy of the exemption in the
minds of policy makers.540 Relaxation of antitrust norms helped instigate the repudiation of free-market principles during the 1930s. Perhaps
it is time that antitrust’s better angels have their way instead.
Indeed, the enforcement agencies sometimes engage in just such advocacy—criticizing current or proposed state or federal limitations on
free-market rivalry.541 Still, such advocacy can be quite uneven. Thus,
the current Antitrust Division has vigorously advocated repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption, while simultaneously remaining silent as
the President and his allies seek stronger labor unions and higher minimum wages, both of which displace free-market competition in wage
setting.542 Mixed messages often fall on deaf ears.
539 Imagine, for instance, if antitrust scholars and practitioners devoted the same time and
energy to limiting the scope of Parker, or repealing McCarran-Ferguson, as they do debating
each other about the precise standards that govern exclusionary conduct.
540 Cf. HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 377, at 752–55 (devoting
thirteen paragraphs to “special problem of municipal antitrust liability”); id. at 739–40 (devoting a mere four paragraphs to the supposed historical basis for the Parker doctrine).
541 See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki et al., Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the
FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091, 1111–12 (2005).
542 See Prohibiting Price Fixing and Other Anticompetitive Conduct in the Health Insurance Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 3–4 (2009) (statement of Christine Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice);
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Parker is an obvious target for such redirected free-market advocacy. No statutory text or constitutional provision commands the decision’s safe harbor for state-created private cartels restraining interstate
commerce and injuring out-of-state consumers. Moreover, as explained
earlier, the decision’s invocation of a supposed lack of legislative intent
regarding state-created cartels was nonsensical, as Congress would have
assumed that states lacked the authority to impose cartels directly restraining interstate commerce.543 If we are to take seriously the absence
of such intent, we must also take seriously the reason for this absence, a
reason that would compel a pointed reexamination of the Parker Court’s
dormant Commerce Clause holding.
If anything, the rationale for wielding the dormant Commerce
Clause against state-compelled cartels is even stronger today than in
1943, given what we have learned about state and federal price-fixing
during the New Deal. Parker embraced as a valid state objective, as
articulated by California’s brief, the reduction of output during an economic downturn so as to prevent ruinous competition and raise prices.
This, of course, was the same rationale behind various NIRA code provisions, not to mention the Appalachian Coals cartel and the provisions
reviewed in New State Ice and Nebbia.
We now know, however, that such price control can itself be ruinous to the macro-economy. Both theory and evidence establish that putting floors under wages and prices exacerbates economic downturns and
slows recovery.544 The national government, of course, has a unique responsibility to stabilize the macro-economy, and Congress has endorsed
“free competitive enterprise” as well as full employment and production
as overriding national goals.545 Recognition that responsibility for
macroeconomic stability is “inherently national,” combined with knowledge about the negative macroeconomic impact of rigid wages and
prices, bolsters the case for a return to the pre-Parker regime whereby
state price fixing or state-conferred monopoly that directly restrains interstate commerce offends the dormant Commerce Clause.546 Anticompetitive protection for a state’s domestic industries should not trump the
stability of the national macro-economy.
President Barack Obama, 2013 State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013) (detailing administration support for higher minimum wages and stronger labor unions).
543 See supra note 460 and accompanying text. See also HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 377, at 739–40 (“[Parker] rests on a fictional reading of the legislative history of the antitrust laws.”).
544 See supra note 486–508 and accompanying text.
545 See 15 U.S.C. § 1021 et seq. (2006) (committing national government to “promote
free competitive enterprise” and full employment, full production, and price stability).
546 See supra note 58–63 and accompanying text. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,
197–209 (1824) (opining that state obstruction of interstate commerce, there a state-granted
monopoly over interstate commerce, violated the commerce clause) (dicta).
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Fifth, and finally, state and federal interference with free competition can take many forms. The most obvious forms involve state-imposed cartels or state-granted monopolies. However, some wolves come
in sheep’s clothing; government efforts to hamper free markets can be
subtle, sometimes even masquerading as competition policy while actually banning efficient practices. Recall, for instance, the numerous trade
practice conferences and NIRA codes that prohibited either or both below-cost pricing and price discrimination as “unfair competition,” regardless of anticompetitive effects. Then came the Robinson-Patman
Act, which banned price discrimination that injured a rival unless justified by (narrowly-defined) cost considerations, again without regard to
the practice’s impact on economic welfare.547 More recently, states, exercising their post-1937 power to regulate restraints of interstate commerce, have banned practices that federal courts have found reasonable
under the Sherman Act, ostensibly in an effort to enhance
“competition.”548
As a result, scholars and lawyers interested in protecting free-market allocation of resources must not confuse useful competition with atomistic rivalry. Competition policy, of whatever source, should take its
cue from the rule of reason explicit in Standard Oil, and implicit in the
Court’s pre-New Deal economic liberty jurisprudence, banning only
those practices that, instead of overcoming market failure, create market
power and economic harm without countervailing efficiencies.549 More
extensive regulation, even if aimed at practices that also raise consumer
prices, will needlessly prevent the realization of substantial efficiencies,
protect inefficient rivals and destroy economic welfare in pursuit of distributional objectives better served in other ways.550
These admonitions are particularly important during a serious economic downturn. The Obama Administration’s Antitrust Division has
claimed that insufficient antitrust enforcement by the prior administration
helped cause the Great Recession and that antitrust condemnation of efficient monopolies that increase purchaser prices will hasten recovery.551
547 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 311–12
(2007) (detailing Robinson-Patman Act’s anticompetitive effects).
548 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
549 See cases cited supra note 74–80 and accompanying text. See also Nat’l Soc’y of
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687–88 (1978) (explaining how enforcement of
private contracts enables competitive markets to function).
550 See Williamson, Allocative Efficiency, supra note 139, at 109–10 (arguing that antitrust law should only ban practices that reduce economic welfare on balance, without regard to
price effects).
551 See Meese, Section 2 and the Great Recession, supra note 20, at 1639 and accompanying text; Daniel Crane, Obama’s Antitrust Agenda, 32 REGULATION, Fall 2009, at 16-17
(noting that the Obama Administration “has gone so far as to suggest that the economic crisis
is partly attributable to lax antitrust enforcement”).
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At the same time, some members of Congress have proposed legislation
banning all minimum RPM, even though such contracts often create
wealth, again in the name of increasing (atomistic) competition and reducing prices.552 However, monopoly earned or preserved by means of
efficient practices will almost certainly create wealth, unlike the New
Deal cartels that destroyed it.553 The same is true for minimum RPM
that courts validate under the rule of reason.554 Banning such efficient
practices simply because they increase purchaser prices will protect inefficient rivals and reduce the nation’s potential output.555 To be sure, economic distress does not justify or otherwise counsel relaxation of anticartel norms.556 Nor, however, does it justify overly aggressive enforcement against efficient practices that create wealth, even when such enforcement purportedly increases the welfare of the particular consumers
that purchase a defendant’s product.557 If the New Deal and its aftermath
taught us anything, it is that regulation seeking to enrich business or labor at the expense of others reduces overall welfare and exacerbates
macroeconomic instability. We know too much today to repeat the very
costly errors of the past.
CONCLUSION
Before the Great Depression, the antitrust laws, dormant Commerce
Clause and Due Process Clauses established free competition as the norm
governing American economic life. New Deal-era legislation and radical
changes in all three sources of competition policy coercively displaced
free competition throughout the economy, and resulting wage and price
fixing during the 1930s deepened and lengthened the Depression. While
the Supreme Court restored “free competition” as the overriding goal of
552 See Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, S. 75, 112th Cong. (2011). Such legislation would “overrule” Leegin Creative Leather Prod.’s, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
898–99 (2007), which properly held that courts should analyze minimum RPM under a rule of
reason.
553 See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare TradeOffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 27 (1968) (explaining how a transaction or practice that creates
non-trivial efficiencies will likely increase overall welfare regardless of the impact on purchasers in the relevant market).
554 See Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions, supra note 528, at 988 (explaining how non-standard agreements that reduce transaction costs facilitate efficient allocation of resources).
555 See Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep
It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 737 (2010).
556 See Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks Prepared for ABA Antitrust Symposium: Competition Policy in Distressed Industries 18–19 (May 13, 2009).
557 See id. at 22–23 (advocating extra-vigilant scrutiny of alleged “exclusionary conduct”
by firms that are healthier than smaller rivals).
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antitrust, neither the dormant Commerce Clause nor the Due Process
Clauses currently prevent government interference with free-market
outcomes.
The most recent recession has increased support for such anticompetitive interference with free competition. However, the nation’s experience with similar schemes during the Depression and New Deal teaches
that such anticompetitive intervention will reduce the nation’s economic
welfare. Hopefully policymakers will learn from the mistakes of the
past, reject these proposals and work to expand and not contract free
competition.

